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I. INTRODUCTION
In the U.S., we are accustomed to treating right-to-health arguments
as non-starters, outside the realm of serious possibility. 1 Yet curiously, our
American aversion to the health rights discourse does not necessarily
reflect rejection of “health” as a value. 2 Instead, our attitude seems based
on a misperception that health rights are inevitably a type of socioeconomic right to affirmative state provision rather than a negative liberty
from state action. 3 This latter type of right, the negative liberty, is thought
to be more congenial to the American legal tradition, while the former is
regarded as a non-justiciable and quixotically foreign concept.4 However
1
Even those who strongly favor such a right have judged U.S. health rights even after
the enactment of the Affordable Care Act to be “unstable,” “weak,” and “elusive.” See
Allison K. Hoffman, A Vision of an Emerging Right to Health Care in the United States:
Expanding Health Care Equity Through Legislative Reform, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 345, 345–346 (Colleen M.
Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014) (describing how even legislated rights are often weakened
by courts); David Orentlicher, Rights to Healthcare in the United States: Inherently
Unstable, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 326 (2012) (documenting the ways in which the
Affordable Care Act fails to change the historical weakness of the right to health in the
U.S.). See generally Jennifer Prah Ruger et al., The Elusive Right to Health Care Under
U.S. Law, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2558 (2015); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State
Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325 (2010).
2
See e.g., William W. Buzbee, CPR Perspective: The Strategies of Regulatory
Underkill, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, http://www.progressivereform.org/perspUnderki
ll.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2019). Indeed, polls show health care was among the most
important issues in the most recent midterms. See e.g., Robert Pearl, Healthcare Is the No.
1 Issue for Voters; A New Poll Reveals Which Healthcare Issue Matters Most, FORBES (Aug
13, 2018, 07:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2018/08/13/midterms/#3865
7bee3667.
3
See e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? 59–79 (1997).
4
See, e.g., Frank Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 862
(2001). But see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV.
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much we may value health, the argument runs, we would distort or break
with our foundational legal character if we recognized health values in the
form of a “right.”
Meanwhile, on another front, a different battle over rights is running
its course. Observers note that our policymaking functions are now held to
cost-benefit default requirements imposed both by courts,5 and by an
executive order that has proven durable regardless of the President’s party
affiliation.6 Even now, Congress is considering codifying such a
requirement. 7 This default requirement of cost-benefit analysis (CBA),
assumed to apply unless Congress clearly intends a different regulatory
standard, has come under criticism on a variety of fronts. CBA posits a
utilitarian world in which values are aggregative and fungible, and thus
capable of being added and traded-off against one another.8 In response,
many have argued that the ascendance of cost-benefit analysis detracts
from non-utilitarian values like rights, distribution, the integrity of human
life, and dignity. 9 For instance, CBA privileges efficiency over distributive
goals, as one commentator has succinctly described: “[A]ll transfer
programs flunk standard CBA: one side loses what another gains, plus
somebody pays for administrative costs.” 10 Moreover, rights are short-

2271, 2273, 2278–79 (1990).
5
See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–08 (2015) (requiring agency to weigh
costs against benefits, unless Congress clearly states otherwise). See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 (2001).
6
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (which has been
retained in substantially similar form through Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, Bush II, and Obama
Administrations).
7
Portman-Heitkamp Regulatory Accountability Act, S. 951, 115 th Cong. § 3(b)(5)
(2017) https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/951/text.
See also,
Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill would require all
agencies, including independent agencies, to consider a “reasonable number of [regulatory]
alternatives” and select the “most cost-effective” rule, unless “the additional benefits of the
more costly rule justify the additional costs of that rule.” This requirement is sometimes
called the “super mandate.” See e.g., William Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory
Muddle: The “Legislative Mirage” of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 298, 306 (1996).
8
See e.g., SIDNEY SHAPIRO & ROBERT GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK :
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 54 (2002).
9
See e.g., Frank Ackerman & Liza Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1567 (2002) (discussing
that it may not be possible to limit the effects of CBA to just those areas for which CBA is
suitable because there are spillover or displacing effects, including that “cost benefit
analysis turns public citizens into selfish consumers and interconnected communities into
atomized individuals”). See generally MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE
MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012); Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace
Intrinsic Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks to Confront the Challenge of
Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 213 (2016).
10
Adam Samaha, Death and Paperwork Reduction, 65 DUKE L.J. 279, 324 (2015)
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shrifted under CBA’s utilitarian approach insofar as rights bind without
regard to individual case-by-case consequences. 11 The nature of rights is
such that an individual’s rights cannot be sacrificed to the greater collective
welfare as a matter of course. Thus CBA, by subjecting all values to tradeoff, fails to adequately acknowledge that some values take the form of
rights.
What if we had a way to value health as a right while remaining
squarely within the American tradition of rights as negative liberties from
state action? And what if this method could also serve as a corrective to
CBA’s blind-spots on rights and distribution? I argue in this article that
Health Impact Assessments (HIAs) would achieve precisely these things.
Therefore, I propose that we require an assessment of all federal regulation
and legislation for its potential impact on human health and its distribution,
even if the policies lie outside what is traditionally considered the health
sector. This HIA requirement, like the other regulatory impact analyses I
discuss below, would also require Congress or an agency, if it were to
pursue such action burdening human health, to expressly justify the adverse
health effects imposed by such action.12 If anything, the regulatory reform
measures that are currently before Congress, rather than mandating CBA
by statute, should include this modest, common-sense, new regulatory
impact assessment requirement.13
My argument is indirect. Others have made strong cases for HIAs on
the merits. I seek to demonstrate that HIAs should be institutionalized
because we have already adopted a set of other regulatory impact
assessments (RIAs) privileging non-health values such as economic
freedom for small business, freedom from paperwork, economic protection
for states and localities, religious liberty, and more, 14 all of which compete
with health. These existing RIAs represent the selective elevation, by
rights-like means, of a highly biased set of priorities with which health
ought to be placed on equal footing.

(citing Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-effectiveness Analysis, 53 DUKE L.J.
1067, 1060–69, 1076 (2003)). This pithy conclusion depends upon CBA being
administered without regard to the fact that the relation between wealth and utility varies
non-linearly, such that the marginal decrease in a wealthy person’s utility from the loss of a
dollar might be lower than the marginal increase to a less well-off person from gaining a
dollar.
11
Even utilitarians can acknowledge rights as absolute and indefeasible in this sense.
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 1, 61–63 (H.B. Acton ed., 1972) (distinguishing rights from expedience).
12
See infra Part V for full description.
13
See e.g., supra note 7; Cross, supra note 4, at 863.
14
See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015)
(arguing that religious liberty is a new guise for economic libertarianism).
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A. The Need to Consider Health Even Within Non-Health Policies
The greatest health challenges today are complex and have many
linked contributing factors, some of which operate far upstream, outside
what we conventionally regard as health policy. It is by now widely
recognized that policies beyond the traditional health-sector affect our
health outcomes no less than policies within our so-called health system. 15
An oft-cited early report from the Centers for Disease Control credited
medical care with only ten to fifteen percent of the reductions in mortality
achieved during the twentieth century. 16 Our knowledge base has now
grown to recognize how “social determinants of health” may have at least
as much effect on health outcomes.17
Thanks to environmental law, many of us recognize that hazardous
chemical exposures in our air, water, food, and workplaces burden human
health. But we are increasingly learning more about the importance of our
social and economic conditions as well.
Housing and our built environment are examples of distal or upstream
factors, wrought by collective policy, that affect population health in
complex socially-mediated ways.18 For instance, lopsided mortgage
interest subsidies to the affluent divert resources from quality affordable
housing options, which we know in turn subjects people to hazardous
exposures such as lead or mold. Indeed, our policy paradigms, such as
those that beget urban sprawl, have been associated with numerous other
health effects. One study found that for every one percent increase in
county compactness (a sprawl index), “traffic fatality rates fell by 1.49
percent and pedestrian fatality rates fell by 1.47 percent.”19 These effects
are a function of government action. 20 For example, federal housing
financing has long favored low-density single-family homes. 21
15

See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Ten Great Public Health
Achievements—United States 1900–1999, 48 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 241
(April 1999).
16
Id.
17
See e.g., Jessica Mantel, Tackling the Social Determinants of Health: A Central Role
for Providers, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 217, 221 (2017).
18
Lauren Taylor, Housing and Health: An Overview of the Literature, HEALTH AFF.
(June 7, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20180313.396577/full/.
19
Reid Ewing & Shima Hamidi, Compactness v. Sprawl: A Review of Recent Evidence
from the United States, 30 J. PLANNING LIT. 413, 425 (2015); PAULA BRAVEMAN ET AL.,
HOUSING AND HEALTH (2011), https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2011/05/housingand-health.html.
20
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 229–230 (1985).
21
See id. See also Heather Hughes, Securitization and Suburbia, 90 OR. L. REV. 359,
391–94 (2011) (tracing how laws governing commercial finance facilitate sprawl); Emily
Badger, How the Federal Government Dramatically Skews the U.S. Real Estate Market,
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Government-financed roads literally paved the way for the automobile. 22
Development assumed its particular character because of single-use zoning
laws as well as ordinances stipulating setbacks and parking. 23 The effects
on human well-being, through physical, mental, and social pathways, are
manifold. 24 Meanwhile, housing instability among renters gravely harms
health, especially the health of children in the household.25 Yet the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development is pursuing new work
requirements to encumber the restricted housing assistance that is
available. 26
The governance of work itself has permitted scheduling and other
arrangements to offload ever more contingency onto workers, increasing
toxic stress and fatigue. 27 And each sector we examine reveals the source
of additional health burdens. Our transportation policies often create new
accident and other risks, as the rise of the railroad28 and the automobile
have made clear.29
CITYLAB (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2013/01/how-us-governmentdramatically-real-estate-market/4337/ (documenting that, even recently, “FHA, for instance,
funneled just one-tenth of its $1.2 trillion in loan guarantees over the past five years toward
multi-family housing”).
22
See Jackson, supra note 20.
23
Id.
24
Andrew L. Dannenberg et al., The Impact of Community Design and Land-Use
Choices on Public Health: A Scientific Research Agenda, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1500,
1500–08 (2003).
25
Megan Sandel et al., Unstable Housing and Caregiver and Child Health in Renter
Families, 141 PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2018).
26
Kriston Capps, HUD May Push New Work Requirements for Public Housing
Residents, CITYLAB (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/02/hud-floatswork-requirements-for-public-housing-residents/552173/.
27
See, e.g., HUMAN IMPACT PARTNERS, SCHEDULING AWAY OUR HEALTH: HOW
UNPREDICTABLE WORK HOURS AFFECT HEALTH AND WELL-BEING (2016),
http://www.humanimpact.org/wp-content/uploads/Scheduling-Away-Our-Health_rev3.pdf.
Such transformation of the workforce has been facilitated by government designation of
these workers as outside certain categories of protection. See, e.g., Karla Walter & Kate
Bahn, Raising Pay and Providing Benefits for Workers in a Disruptive Economy, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2
017/10/13/440483/raising-pay-providing-benefits-workers-disruptive-economy/.
See
generally JEFFREY PFEFFER, DYING FOR A PAYCHECK (2018).
28
See generally MARK ALDRICH, DEATH RODE THE RAILS: AMERICAN RAILROAD
ACCIDENTS AND SAFETY 1828–1965 (2006). For discussion of how tort law responded to
this externalization of costs by railroads onto others, see MORTON HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, 97–101 (1977) (observing that “most of
the cases involving injuries to persons or property after 1840 were brought about by the
activity of canals or railroads”).
29
See generally JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY (1991). See e.g., Sandro Galea, Making the Acceptable Unacceptable, B.U. SCH.
PUB. HEALTH (June 4, 2015), https://www.bu.edu/sph/2015/06/14/making-the-acceptableunacceptable/ (observing that “[d]espite a dramatic increase in number of vehicle miles
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Our agricultural and economic development subsidies may be
transferring risk from agricultural and fast-food enterprises to individuals.
When we subsidize corn rather than fruits and vegetables, even as cheap
high-fructose corn syrup has fostered excessive consumption of added
sugars, do we consider the potential health effects? 30 Meanwhile the Small
Business Administration has poured funding into fast-food franchises in
low-income neighborhoods in the name of urban revitalization, 31 even as
land use, zoning and other regulations deterred supermarkets from locating
there.32
Socioeconomic conditions, including relative social position, 33 are
powerful determinants of health.34 Even when poverty and deprivation
recede as health threats, the health problems due to socio-economic status
(SES) factors do not disappear. The level of inequality in a society itself
can impose health burdens on the community. 35 Comparing equally
wealthy countries, health outcomes are superior in egalitarian societies
compared to ones with steeper economic gradients. 36 Yet our tax policies
traveled, we reduced, in just one generation, the risk of motor vehicle fatality five-fold
[through] road safety, advocacy for safer driving, and legal disincentives for unsafe
driving”). For a recent example of our subsidization of transportation technologies,
including self-driving automobiles presumably with inadequate regard for health risk, see
Jerry Hirsh, Elon Musk’s Growing Empire Is Fueled by $4.9 Billion in Government
Subsidies, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-hy-musksubsidies-20150531-story.html.
30
See, e.g., Scott Fields, The Fat of the Land: Do Agricultural Subsidies Foster Poor
Health?, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A820, A821 (2004). See generally David Wallinga,
Agricultural Policy and Childhood Obesity: A Food Systems and Public Health
Commentary, 29 HEALTH AFF. 405 (2010).
31
Karina Christiansen, Franchising Inequality, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1141, 1141 (2017)
(reviewing CHIN JOU, SUPERSIZING URBAN AMERICA: HOW INNER CITIES GOT FAST FOOD
WITH GOVERNMENT HELP (2017)).
32
Alan Ehrenhalt, The Grocery Gap, GOVERNING (April 2006), http://www.governing.
com/topics/mgmt/Grocery-Gap.html.
33
See generally MICHAEL MARMOT, STATUS SYNDROME : HOW SOCIAL STANDINGS
AFFECT OUR HEALTH AND LONGEVITY (2004); R.G. WILKINSON, UNHEALTHY SOCIETIES: THE
AFFLICTIONS OF INEQUALITY (1996); R.G. WILKINSON, MIND THE GAP: HIERARCHIES,
HEALTH AND HUMAN EVOLUTION (2000); Angus Deaton, Health Inequality and Economic
Development, 41 PRINCETON J. ECON. LIT. 113 (2001). See also, Joshua Holland, High
Inequality Results in More US Deaths than Tobacco, Car Crashes and Guns Combined,
MOYERS & CO. (Apr. 19, 2014), http://billmoyers.com/2014/04/19/high-inequality-resultsin-more-us-deaths-than-tobacco-car-crashes-and-guns-combined/#.VY1GJPrs9dk.twitter.
34
See generally NORM DANIELS ET AL., IS INEQUALITY BAD FOR OUR HEALTH? (2001).
35
NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 83–87 (2008).
36
RICHARD WILKINSON, MIND THE GAP: HIERARCHIES, HEALTH AND HUMAN
EVOLUTION (2000). See also MARMOT, supra note 33; Kate Pickett & Richard Wilkinson,
Income Inequality and Health: A Causal Review, 128 SOC. SCI. & MED. 316 (2015); NANCY
E. ADLER ET AL., REACHING FOR A HEALTHIER LIFE : FACTS ON SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND
HEALTH IN THE U.S. (2008), http://www.macses.ucsf.edu/downloads/reaching_for_a_healthi
er_life.pdf.
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are ever more unequal with predictable health impacts.37 For instance,
every ten percent reduction in the Earned Income Tax Credit increases
infant mortality by 23.2 per 100,000 births.38
Education is arguably the SES factor most profoundly correlated with
health outcomes. Globally, educational status, especially that of the
mother,39 as well as literacy, particularly male-female disparity in adult
literacy, are among the strongest predictors of life-expectancy. 40
Meanwhile our system leaves far too many behind as the fashioning of
choice or charter policies and diversion of funding to private schools
reinforce disparity in educational opportunity. 41
Meanwhile, incarceration policies harm prisoner health in lasting
ways, not to mention their effect on the children of incarcerated parents,
and even on the health of those who merely live in communities with “toxic
exposure” to mass incarceration.42
As yet uncertain-health threats lurk in other non-health sector policies.
For instance, special immunities granted to social media platforms
37
See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TJCA), Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054
(2017). See William Gale et al., A Preliminary Assessment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017, 71 NAT’L TAX J. 589 (2018) (assessing the TJCA and concluding that its effect would
be to make the distribution of after-tax income less equal).
38
See Peter A. Muennig et al., Cost Effectiveness of the Earned Income Tax Credit as a
Health Policy Investment, 51 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 874, 874–881 (2016). See also
William H. Dow et al., A Way Out from Rock Bottom: Economic Policies Can Reduce
Deaths of Despair, VOX CEPR POLICY PORTAL (July 7, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/eco
nomic-policies-can-reduce-deaths-despair.
39
See Emmanuela Gakidou et al., Increased Educational Attainment and Its Effect on
Child Mortality in 175 Countries Between 1970 and 2009: A Systematic Analysis, 376
LANCET 959, 959 (2010).
40
See DANIELS, supra note 35, at 88.
41
Dana Goldman & James P. Smith, The Increasing Value of Education to Health, 72
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1728, 1728 (2011); Stuart J. Olshansky et al., Differences in Life
Expectancy Due to Race and Educational Differences Are Widening, and Many May Not
Catch Up, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1803, 1803–04 (2012). See also Bruce D. Baker, Exploring the
Consequences of Charter School Expansion in U.S. Cities, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 30,
2016), http://www.epi.org/publication/exploring-the-consequences-of-charter-school-expans
ion-in-u-s-cities/#_ref14.
42
See ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: AN EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2013) (describing in Chapter 8 the effects of the “toxic
exposure” to mass incarceration on individuals and their communities”); Mark L.
Hatzenbuehler et al., The Collateral Damage of Mass Incarceration: Risk of Psychiatric
Morbidity Among Nonincarcerated Residents of High-Incarceration Neighborhoods, 105
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 138, 138 (2015); Christopher Wildeman, Imprisonment and (Inequality
in) Population Health, 41 SOC. SCI. RES. 74, 74 (2012) (showing that parental incarceration
substantially increases infant mortality risk); Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., Epidemiology of
Infectious Disease-Related Death After Release from Prison, Washington State, United
States, and Queensland, Australia: A Cohort Study, 131 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 574, 574
(2016),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4937119/; @brujacontumbao,
TWITTER (Jul. 5, 2019), https://twitter.com/brujacontumbao/status/1147238292448075777.
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subsidize them at the expense of young people who face more mental
health risks, particularly if they are vulnerable because of gender, sexual
identity, or other characteristics. 43 Whole literatures exist to examine the
relationship between global trade and human development. 44 Indeed, largescale ideologically clustered policies, such as neoliberalism itself, have
been interrogated for their role in population health and the wave of socalled “deaths of despair.”45
A structured regime of HIAs would provide a way to frame some of
these arguments in the language of a procedural right. We already in some
contexts and in some states, provide that when non-health laws are
deliberated, people are entitled to demand an accounting of the associated
health burden and a justification of the attendant suffering. 46
When trade agreements and economic legislation affect health, as they
have by fostering the global spread of tobacco, why are the trade
proponents exempt from proving that there is no less health-restrictive
alternative?47 After all, nations that impose sanitary and phytosanitary
policies must justify them as the least-trade-restrictive. 48 Health should be
accommodated when laws grant government monopolies that raise the
price of drugs, and indeed there are scattered but underutilized provisions
for public health-based exceptions from government-granted exclusivities
to inventions and plant varieties. 49 In theory, health rights could also trim
back federal grants of liability relief to gun manufacturers. 50
43
See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018) (providing liability relief to internet platforms). See also
David D. Luxton et al., Social Media and Suicide: A Public Health Perspective, 102 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH S195, S195 (2012); Rae Ellen Bichell, Suicide Rates Climb in U.S., Especially
Among Adolescent Girls, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/he
alth-shots/2016/04/22/474888854/suicide-rates-climb-in-u-s-especially-among-adolescentgirls.
44
See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
45
Ted Schrecker, Neoliberalism and Health: The Linkages and the Dangers, 10 SOC.
COMPASS 952, 952–71 (2016). See also AUDREY CHAPMAN, GLOBAL HEALTH, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND THE CHALLENGE OF NEOLIBERAL POLICIES (2016).
46
See infra text accompanying notes 82–88.
47
See, e.g., BENN MCGRADY, TRADE AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE WTO, TOBACCO,
ALCOHOL, AND DIET (2011).
48
See Benn McGrady & Christina S. Ho, Identifying Gaps in International Food Safety
Regulations, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183, 190 (2011).
49
7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2018); 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2018). See
also 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2018) (allowing compulsory licenses for devices for reducing air
pollution); WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., EXCLUSIONS FROM PATENTABILITY AND EXCEPTIONS
AND LIMITATIONS TO P ATENTEES’ RIGHTS 2 (2015), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/e
n/scp_15/scp_15_3-annex1.pdf.
50
15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2018). See also Charles E. Koop & George Lundberg,
Violence in America: A Public Health Emergency Time to Bite the Bullet Back, 267 JAMA
3075 (1992). See also ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE : PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS
OF F ORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003) (describing a case where a
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Others have made more comprehensive cases for the “Health in All
Policies” approach. The evidence continues to mount, and I cannot do it
justice here. My case for HIAs is different; I aim to show that without
HIAs, our current regime of regulatory analysis privileges competing nonhealth values using rights-grammar in a way that has long gone unobserved
and unexplained. HIAs must be institutionalized in order to level the
playing field. These other purposes compete with and burden health and
we need some means of checking them. There are human costs to the
unfettered pursuit of human welfare and development narrowly construed
as consumption, production, and trade. 51 HIAs supply a way of making
these arguments so that government action advancing neoliberal interests at
the expense of the populace can be blocked or mitigated.
B. HIA as a Negative Right
Use of HIA to call for an accounting of such government policies
would not be a right to affirmative provision, but a claim of freedom from
these health-harming measures. The claim contrasts with the approach of
some libertarian scholars who conceptualize the negative right to health as
a freedom from government restriction of choice in medical treatment. 52
This narrower medical autonomy right would disfavor mandatory
vaccination and possibly invalidate FDA pre-market drug approval
requirements. 53 This is a blinkered, and not necessarily health-promoting
view of the government’s role in health, as Jennifer Prah Ruger and others
have lamented. 54 My project aims to show that a negative right to health
properly conceived in the form of an HIA regime would meaningfully
address some of the major health challenges we confront today.

Texas district court judge held that a man’s constitutional right to bear arms trumps the
public safety policy encoded in by a federal law forbidding domestic violence offenders
from owning firearms) (citing United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex.
1999), rev’d and remanded 270 F.3d 203, 261–63 (5th Cir. 2001) (reversed on the basis that
though the federal law protecting public safety did not protect a right, it was sufficiently
narrowly drawn to co-exist with the right to firearms)).
51
See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., FOR GOOD MEASURE :
ADVANCING RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING METRICS BEYOND GDP (Joseph E. Stiglitz et al.
eds., 2018), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307278-en.
52
See e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209,
2210–11 (2011); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA Litigation
and the Extension of Indirect Protection to Nonfundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. L. REV. 639
(2012); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2007).
53
See Volokh, supra note 52, at 1816.
54
Jennifer Prah Ruger, Governing Health, 121 HARV. L. REV. F. 43 (2017) (responding
to Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment
for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007)).
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A caveat first: the divide between positive and negative rights is
overdrawn, and I would rather not reinforce it here. We live in such a
complex world, and there is almost nothing about our current set of
conditions that is not a function of some kind of state action. 55 Therefore, it
is possible to characterize any action either as a demand to be free from
state action of one particular kind, or as a demand for state action or
forbearance of another.56 Our existing economic rights are not negative
rights exactly: they are decisions to assure government backing for certain
economic holdings.57
To the degree that such artificial divisions between positive and
negative rights are still used to police the boundaries of U.S. rights
discourse, however, I am arguing that a right to health in the form of a right
to HIA falls well within these boundaries.
C. What is a Health Impact Assessment?
HIA has been defined as “a combination of procedures, methods, and
tools by which a policy, program, or project may be judged as to its
potential effects on the health of a population, and the distribution of those
effects within the population.”58 In short, the HIAs I propose would subject
federal government action to a routine accounting of its impact on health
and the distribution of health. 59

55
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 (1997)
(“Whether people have a preference for a commodity, a right, or anything else is in part a
function of whether the government has allocated it to them in the first instance. There is no
way to avoid the task of initially allocating an entitlement (short of anarchy).”). See also
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL.
SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923).
56
SUNSTEIN, supra note 55, at 17; Hale, supra note 55, at 470.
57
See also BERNARD HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF A FREE MARKET : PUNISHMENT AND
THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 47 (2010) (explaining, “In all markets, the state is present.
Naturally, it is present when it fixes the price of a commodity such as wheat or bread. But it
is also present when it subsidizes the cultivation or production of wheat, when it grants a
charter to the Chicago Board of Trade, when it permits trading of an instrument like a
futures contract, when it protects the property interests of wheat wholesalers.”).
58
Andrew L. Dannenberg et al., Use of Health Impact Assessment in the U.S.: 27 Case
Studies, 1999–2007, 34 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 241, 241 (2008) (citation omitted). See
also COMM. ON HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT ET AL., IMPROVING HEALTH IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE ROLE OF HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT 5 (2011) [hereinafter “For the Public’s
Health”] (defining HIA much as the Gothenburg paper, infra note 74, does, to mean “a
systematic process that uses an array of data sources and analytic methods and considers
input from stakeholders to determine the potential effects of a proposed policy, plan,
program, or project on the health of a population and the distribution of those effects within
the population. HIA provides recommendations on monitoring and managing those
effects.”).
59
In this article, I explore the policy of a federal HIA requirement, although, HIA
requirements at state, transnational and other levels are also important steps forward.

HO (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

LEGISLATING A NEGATIVE RIGHT TO HEALTH

12/21/2019 3:51 PM

655

HIAs conventionally involve six stages: screening, scoping,
assessment, recommendation, reporting, and finally, monitoring and
evaluation.60 Sometimes called the Liverpool approach, the sequence of
steps has been specified in the literature as follows:
[A]pplying a screening procedure to select policies or projects
for assessment; defining the scope of the health impact
assessment in terms of depth, duration, spatial and temporal
boundaries, methods, outputs, and the like; policy analysis;
profiling the areas and communities likely to be affected by the
policy; collecting qualitative and quantitative data on potential
impacts from stakeholders and key informants, using a
predefined model of determining health impact; evaluating the
importance, scale, and likelihood (and, if possible, cost) of
potential impacts; searching for the evidence to validate data;
undertaking option appraisal (i.e., developing and choosing from
alternative options) and developing recommendations for action;
and
monitoring
and
evaluating
results
following
implementation.61
HIA differs from some related tools. 62 Risk assessments, for instance, are
focused on discrete chemical exposure scenarios rather than the
comprehensive consideration of a wider array of upstream health
determinants.63 CBA includes less qualitative information than HIA, and
HIA emphasizes a deliberative process, rather than an analytical approach,
especially in the screening, scoping, assessment, and recommendation
steps.64
1. Link Between Health Impact Assessment and Equity
Built into the conventional way HIA is conducted are a number of
equity-promoting features, even leaving aside for the moment how equity
may already be necessary to the project of population health.65 First, the
60

See For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 7.
Eileen O’Keefe & Alex Scott-Samuel, Human Rights and Wrongs: Could Health
Impact Assessment Help?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 734, 734–35 (2002).
62
See, e.g., Different Types of Health Assessment, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION : HEALTHY PLACES, https://www.cdc.gov/healthyplaces/types_health_assessmen
ts.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2016); Other Impact Assessments, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/hia/tools/other_IA/en/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
63
JAMES G. HODGE, KIM WEDENAAR, & LEILA BARRAZA, THE NETWORK FOR PUB.
HEALTH LAW, INTEGRATION OF HEALTH AND HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENTS VIA
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACTS 8 (2016), https://www.networkforphl.org/_asset/ltcwv8/PE
W-HIA-NEPA-Stage-1—-Report-FINAL.pdf.
64
For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 127–28.
65
See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 35, at 85 (explaining that because the effect of SES
factors on health is steeper for those who are worse off, therefore “transfers of resources
from the best-off to the worst-off SES groups would improve aggregate health and would
61
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identification of affected groups and communities is integral to the
methodology, as is evident in the six stages described above. 66 Also, HIAs
are inseparable from assessments of health disparity. HIAs by nature
screen for differential impact, thereby necessarily identifying inequity.
Moreover, an HIA detects disparities in baseline health in the process of
measuring for differential impact and therefore involve health disparity
impact assessment as well. Furthermore, the analytical steps described
above specifically call for the participation of stakeholders in contributing
information or data to be deliberatively considered. 67 Some observers have
also argued that when non-health policies impose detrimental health
burdens, those burdens “disproportionately affect[] the already
disadvantaged”68 such that focusing on health impacts will tend to be
equity-focused, rather than neutral to distribution. 69
There is also accumulating evidence, as discussed earlier, that
inequality is a major determinant driving poor health outcomes, and
therefore any measure that screens for detriment to health will tend to
identify and capture policies that exacerbate inequality. 70
As is the case with all rights, however, this equity-promoting valence
of HIAs can be disrupted or reversed. 71 The National Research Council
have little negative effect, if any, on the best-off groups”). The implication is that
improving population health, certainly doing so within a resource horizon, necessitates
equity. Moreover, inequality itself may negatively impact health outcomes. See DANIELS,
supra note 34. For another view of how population health inherently contemplates health
equity see David Kindig & Greg Stoddart, What Is Population Health?, 93 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 380, 380–81 (2003).
66
STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION WORKING GRP. OF THE 2010 HIA IN THE AMS.
WORKSHOP, GUIDANCE AND BEST PRACTICES FOR STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN HEALTH
IMPACT ASSESSMENT -VERSION 1.0- (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2012/0
3/01/guidance_best_practices_stakeholder_participation_hia.pdf.
67
See supra text accompanying note 64.
68
See O’Keefe & Scott-Samuel, supra note 61, at 735.
69
Id. See also Ray Quigley et al., Health Impact Assessment International Best
Practice Principles: Special Publication Series Number 5, INT’L ASS’N FOR IMPACT
ASSESSMENT : FARGO USA (2006), (on file with author) (outlining a set of values underlying
HIAs). But see For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 94.
70
Richard Wilkinson & Kate Pickett, The Science Is In: Greater Equality Makes
Societies Healthier and Richer, EVONOMICS (Jan. 26, 2017), http://evonomics.com/wilkinso
n-pickett-income-inequality-fix-economy/. See also supra text accompanying notes 33–36.
71
See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122
YALE L.J. 2188 (2013); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the
Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1589 (1984); Morton J. Horwitz,
Rights, 23 HARV. C.R-C L. L. REV. 393, 396–97 (1988); Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of
Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 182 (Wendy Brown &
Janet Halley eds., 2002); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1364
(1984); Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 26 (1993); Robin West,
A Tale of Two Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 893, 893 (2014); Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The
Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713, 714 (2011); Peter
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report is careful to note that the equity-favoring tilt of HIAs is a contingent
and possibly temporary feature: “HIA could conceivably contribute to
health inequities if more socioeconomically or politically advantaged
communities develop greater capacity to demand HIA or if health issues
that are highlighted in HIA are focused on the health needs of the
advantaged.”72
D. History and Precedent
Some have sourced the HIA tool’s origins in the World Health
Organization (WHO) Ottawa Charter on Health Promotion of 1986, which
called for the “systematic assessment of the health impact of a rapidly
changing environment—particularly in areas of technology, work, energy
production, and urbanization.”73 WHO followed with a Gothenburg
Consensus document on HIAs in 1999. 74
In 2006, HIAs were
recommended as standard in screening large World Bank projects and are
now adopted by the Bank’s private sector counterpart, the International
Finance Corporation.75 Their use has proliferated globally. British
Columbia and Quebec require HIAs for all government legislation. 76 HIAs
are included in the Thai constitution. 77 The London mayor’s office
construed HIAs as part of the office’s statutory remit for a number of
years.78 Finland, Australia, New Zealand, Wales, and the European
Community have to varying extents adopted HIA practices. 79 WHO has
Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of “Rights”, 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 1003 (1986). See also
Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health
Inequities?, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 33, 34 (2009). See also Solomon R. Benatar, Human
Rights in the Biotechnology Era, 2 BMC INT’L HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. 1, 3 (2002). See
also JONATHAN WOLFF, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 36–38 (2012).
72
For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 94.
73
WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE OTTAWA CHARTER FOR HEALTH PROMOTION (1986),
https://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/previous/ottawa/en/index1.html.
74
See generally EUR. CENTRE FOR HEALTH POL’Y & WHO REG’L OFF. FOR EUR.,
GOTHENBURG CONSENSUS PAPER: HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT MAIN CONCEPTS AND
SUGGESTED APPROACH (1999), http://www.healthedpartners.org/ceu/hia/hia01/01_02_gothe
nburg_paper_on_hia_1999.pdf.
75
Ben Harris-Roxas & Elizabeth Harris, Differing Forms, Differing Purposes: A
Typology of Health Impact Assessment, 31 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 396, 396
(2010).
76
For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 131.
77
Thailand’s Constitution of 2017, CONSTITUTE PROJECT § 58 (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Thailand_2017.pdf?lang=en.
78
J. Mindell et al., Health Impact Assessment as an Agent of Policy Change: Improving
the Health Impacts of the Mayor of London’s Draft Transport Strategy, 58 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
& COMTY. HEALTH 3, 169, 169–71 (2004), http://jech.bmj.com/content/58/3/169.
79
For the Public’s Health, supra note 58, at 15, 141, 144, 159, 162; LAURA GOTTLIEB
& PAULA BRAVEMAN, HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT : A TOOL FOR PROMOTING HEALTH IN
ALL POLICIES 6 (2011), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2011/rw
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also promoted HIA methods in part through the WHO Healthy Cities
European Network. 80
This practice is already in increasingly extensive, if sporadic, use in
U.S states and localities. 81 In one study, twenty-two of thirty-six sampled
jurisdictions in the U.S. have made some legal provision for HIAs when
environmental and energy policies are considered, while seven out of the
thirty-six jurisdictions do so for agriculture or transportation policies. 82
HIAs are sometimes included as part of the environmental impact
assessment required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
which I discuss in greater depth in Part II.C. NEPA regulations include
health among the “direct, indirect, and cumulative effects” of the proposed
action and alternatives that must be considered in environmental impact
reporting.83 While EPA can take health into account by using alternative
tools, it has deliberately chosen the HIA methodology within its
environmental assessments as part of its Sustainable and Healthy
Communities Research Program. 84 EPA concluded in its April 2014
briefing paper that employment of the HIA methodology “helped raise
awareness and bring health into decisions outside traditional health-related
fields.”85 During Obama’s second term, Susan Bromm declared an EPA
preference for HIAs over narrower risk assessments in the environmental
impact reporting process because they capture the range of direct, indirect,

jf70449.
80
Erica Ison, Health Impact Assessment in a Network of European Cities, 90 J. URB.
HEALTH 105, 105 (2013); Health Impact Assessment, WORLD HEALTH ORG. REG’L OFF. FOR
EUR., http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/environment-and-health/urban-health/activit
ies/health-impact-assessment (last visited October 24, 2019).
81
Dannenberg et al., supra note 58. See also, JONATHON HELLER ET AL., PROMOTING
EQUITY THROUGH THE PRACTICE OF HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT 8 (2013),
https://kresge.org/sites/default/files/Promoting-equity-through-health-impact-assessment2013.pdf.
82
ALICIA CORBETT ET AL., LEGAL REVIEW CONCERNING THE USE OF HEALTH IMPACT
ASSESSMENTS IN NON-HEALTH SECTORS 4 (2012), https://www.issuelab.org/resources/13060
/13060.pdf. See also Doug Farquhar, An Analysis of State Health Impact Assessment
Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE ST. LEGISLATURES (July 17, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/res
earch/environment-and-natural-resources/an-analysis-of-state-health-impact-assessmentlegislation635411896.aspx.
83
40 C.F.R. §1502.16 (2019); § 1508.7–8.
84
Memorandum from Susan E. Bromm & Michael Slimak to Regional NEPA
Directors (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-3/documents/hia
_memo_from_bromm.pdf [hereinafter Bromm & Slimak Memo].
85
SCIENCE IN ACTION : INNOVATIVE RESEARCH FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, OFF. RES.
AND DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2014) (on file with the author). See also Jessica
Wentz, Incorporating Public Health Assessments into Climate Change Action, in CLIMATE
CHANGE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 403, 415 (Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach eds.,
2018).
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and cumulative effects.86 For various reasons, however, including
institutional insularity and gaps in research connecting policies to their
ultimate health effects, this HIA mechanism remains underutilized, and
health effects are not always identified in the environmental impact
assessment process.87 Furthermore, NEPA-based health assessments
cannot account for the health effects of many policies like tax measures
that operate through economically or socially mediated pathways. 88
E. Model of a Right as a Privileged Distributed Interest Triggering
Special Justification Duties
So far, I have shown some ways to deploy HIAs, but I have not yet
demonstrated my claim that HIAs are a form of a right to health. Here, I
use an account of rights as weighted or prioritized political norms with
three features we would plausibly recognize as characteristic of rights.
Rights are typically (though to varying extents) differentiated from
“utilitarian goals” or “policy” values.”89 For instance, Ronald Dworkin
observes that these non-rights values can be pursued in a cumulative way,
and indeed frictionlessly traded-off against one another, while rights cannot
be handled thus.90 By contrast, policies, unlike rights, can be pursued and
maximized in the aggregate. 91 Thus “policy goals” constitute a category of
political norms that can be handled through CBA. 92
1. Individuation/Claiming
A right, however, is a value that resists cumulative consideration.
First, it requires some sort of individuation to be properly honored. 93
“Goals” are advanced in any instance where they prevail such that if one
person’s welfare suffers in any given transaction, another transaction can
make up for that welfare loss. The impairment of a right in one case (say
the deprivation of a right to vote), however, is not rectified by giving
someone two votes next time. In Dworkin’s example, the protection of an
86

Bromm & Slimak Memo, supra note 84.
See HODGE, supra note 63, at 19–20.
88
See e.g., PUB. HEALTH ENG., PSYCHOSOCIAL PATHWAYS AND HEALTH OUTCOMES:
INFORMING ACTION ON HEALTH INEQUALITIES 50 (2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/pu
blications/psychosocial-pathways-and-health-outcomes.
89
For instance, there are those whose positions are more strictly grounded in the
deontological tradition, and those who are on the more rule-utilitarian end of the spectrum.
See e.g., Samaha, supra note 10, at 290.
90
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 91–92 (1978).
91
Id. at 91.
92
See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 1556. See also Sidney Shapiro
& Christopher Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 438 (2008).
93
DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 91(describing rights as an “individuated political aim”).
87
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individual’s liberty to purchase contraception does not mean that the next
individual’s liberty can be violated because “enough sexual liberty” has
been secured. 94 No matter how much you serve the value that is a “right,”
the value is still undermined if it is not recognized in any single case to
which it applies. This individuation follows from Dworkin’s imputation of
principled integrity and consistency as features of rights.95
Though the individuation of rights for Dworkin flows from his
distinctive account, other scholars also insist upon the individuated aspect
of rights, though grounded in their own outlooks. Feinberg operationalizes
this characteristic of rights in an even more demanding way, arguing that
true rights must be able to be “claimed” by the rights-holder to distinguish
them from duty-based obligations which may have incidental
beneficiaries. 96 This characteristic that rights can be claimed by the
individual rights-holder is widely recognized, but dialed up or down in
stringency based on the theory of rights.
MacCormick describes the line between rights and duties as less a
demarcation and more an adaptable continuum:
There may indeed be simple cases in which some general duty—
e.g. a duty not to assault—is imposed upon everyone at large
with a view to protecting the physical security of each and every
person in society, and where the ‘right not to be assaulted’ is
simply the correlative of the duty not to assault; no doubt in such
simple cases the ‘terminology of rights’ does not enable us to say
very much more than can be said in the terminology of duty. But
it may be well adapted even in this simple case to expressing a
reason why people aggrieved by breaches of certain duties
should be empowered to take various measures and actions at
law to secure remedies therefore. 97

94

DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 88.
See DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 81.
96
See e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY : ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 143, 154–55 (1980).
97
Donald. N. MacCormick, Rights in Legislation, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY :
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 189, 203–04 (Peter Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1979).
See also, Donald N. MacCormick, Dworkin as a Pre-Benthamite, 87 PHIL. REV. 585, 599
(1978) [hereinafter Pre-Benthamite] (on the difference between rights and duties: “When
positive laws establish rights . . . what they do is secure individuals . . . in the enjoyment of
some good or other. But not by way of a collective good collectively enjoyed, like clean air
in a city, but rather an individual good individually enjoyed by each, like the protection of
each occupier’s particular environment as secured by the law of private nuisance. Such
protection is characteristically achieved by imposing duties on people at large, for example,
not to bring about certain kinds of adverse changes to the environment of land or premises
occupied by someone else, and further duties, which may be invoked at the instance of any
aggrieved occupier, to make good damage arising from adverse environmental change.”).
95
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Feinberg himself does not require that claimability necessarily include
the ability to invoke judicial redress or even a legal rather than moral
claim. 98 Moreover, Raz cites examples, such as children’s rights (which
children are often not empowered to raise) that belie the notion that “to
have a legal right is to have control over its corresponding duty, i.e. to have
legal powers to take protective legal action.” 99
Nevertheless, rights do need to be distinguished from general duties to
the public at large and therefore in making the case for impact assessments
as rights, we must prove that the obligations they impose can be described
as distributed to some individual rights-holder, regardless of whether the
rights-holder can always seek legal redress for violations.
2. Privileged: Needing Special Justification to Overcome
Presumption
In addition to some claimability, however loosely or stringently
construed, rights have other distinctive characteristics.
In a rough way we might say for values to be rights, they must
presumptively withstand compromise in favor of competing values. 100 One
must offer special justification surmounting the presumption in order to
harm a value that has the status of a right.101 By one account, rights are
prioritized, or even ranked102 by means of “heavier weighting for principles
concerning rights than for pure policies.” 103 While MacCormick uses the
term “weighting” to describe even Dworkin’s view of the priority of rights,
Dworkin himself might have demurred.104 His prioritization of the right
would permit the countervailing value to outweigh only (1) when “the
values protected by the original right are not really at stake,” (2) “some
competing right . . . would be abridged,” or (3) “the cost to society . . .
would be of a degree far beyond the cost paid to grant the original right, a
degree great enough to justify whatever assault on dignity or equality might
be involved.”105 To the extent one could characterize this view of rights as
98

Feinberg, supra note 96, at 154.
Jospeh Raz, Legal Rights, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4, 19 (1984).
100
See DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 93 (making clear that background moral rights are
not necessarily justiciable rights). DWORKIN, supra note 90, at xi (describing rights as
“political trumps held by individuals[,]” such that merely choosing to favor one interest is
insufficient to justify an act promoting that interest, particularly if it comes at the expense of
another kind of privileged interest).
101
DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 199.
102
DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 117.
103
See Pre-Benthamite, supra note 97, at 592.
104
Others have challenged whether Dworkin himself really adhered to this view. See
generally Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 309,
310 (2000).
105
DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 200.
99
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a presumption that could be overcome by a weighty consideration, the
consideration would have to be extremely weighty indeed.
Others however, are not so strict. Schauer characterizes values as
rights if they, like armor, can resist “low justification” or “small bore”
countervailing reasons, but not larger bore reasons for violation.106 Robert
Alexy has formulated a theory that rights are subject to a form of weighted
balancing. 107 Nevertheless, certain structural features of a right are similar,
even if the stringency of the standards to qualify under each property might
vary with the theory of rights to which one subscribes.
All accounts share the requirement of special justification to
overcome a right, and that special justification is structured often as a
“proportionality test.” Alison Young explains why:
[R]ights . . . rul[e] out some methods of balancing and giv[e] an
element of additional weight to . . . rights in the balancing
process . . . . Proportionality is the best means of achieving this
balancing because the test of proportionality is capable of
assigning greater weight to . . . rights in the balancing exercise,
and of restricting the range of justifications that can be used to
restrict a . . . right.108
David Beatty also concludes that “proportionality review is the
‘ultimate’ rule of law for resolving constitutional questions about rights,”109
and Aharon Barak claims, “[p]roportionality, therefore, can be defined as
the set of rules determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
limitation of a constitutionally protected right by a law to be
constitutionally permissible.”110
106
Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 429
(1993).
107
See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 388 (Julian Rivers trans.,
2002).
108
Alison L. Young, Proportionality Is Dead: Long Live Proportionality!, in
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING 43, 47 (Grant
Huscroft et al. eds., 2014).
109
Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Rights in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L. J.
3094, 3094 n.1 (2015) (quoting DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159–188
(2004)).
110
AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY : CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS 3 (2012). He goes on to identify the “four sub-components of proportionality”
under which “a limitation of a constitutionally protected right will be constitutionally
permissible if:
(i) it is designated for a proper purpose, (ii) the measures undertaken to
effectuate such a limitation are rationally connected to the fulfillment of that
purpose, (iii) the measures undertaken are necessary in that there are no
alternative measures that may similarly achieve that same purpose with a
lesser degree of limitation; and finally (iv) . . . a proper relation ( . . . or
‘balancing’) between the importance of achieving the proper purpose and the
social importance of preventing the limitation of the constitutional right.
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It is therefore no surprise that the presumption-privileged tradeoff of a
right in U.S. law figures commonly as a species of triggered proportionality
test with pre-set weights.111 Our constitutional rights doctrine often
requires (1) a showing of sufficiency of purpose, (2) means-ends
rationality, and (3) least-restrictive means. I will refer to these last two
inquiries under the umbrella term, “fit.” The tradeoff must meet a fit
threshold presumably because the right is so important that the
infringement, indeed the entire extent of infringement, must be justified by
the sufficiently weighty countervailing purpose, without excess. 112 Many
of these accounts of proportionality also add an explicit “balancing” prong,
which I exclude here because it is implicit in the notion that the privileged
value can be overcome by the decision-makers in this context.113
3. Three Common Elements
From the accounts summarized above, I distill a minimal set of
common elements. They are not the only ways to protect a right. 114 These
elements, if present, however, signal that a value is being treated as a right,
particularly against the background of flat CBA by default, which
predominates in the policy realm. 115 We can be alerted to rights-reasoning
at work whenever we see an interest whose trade-off requires a special
showing of 1) sufficiency of purpose, 2) a special showing of fit, and 3)
confers some claim upon an individual rights-holder, albeit not always a
judicial claim.

Id.
111
See generally Jackson, supra note 109 (documenting how many tests for U.S.
constitutional rights qualify as proportionality tests, with some exceptions such as in First
Amendment doctrine concerning speech inciting violence, and Fourth Amendment law).
See also Richard Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1316–1317
(2008).
112
See ALEXY, supra note 107, at 229, 395–97, 399 (subdividing the “fit” prong into
“suitability” and “necessity” inquiries, while excluding the “purpose” or “ends-test” as a
necessary step, but separate from proportionality analysis, which he maintains is neutral as
to ends).
113
See Jackson, supra note 109, at 3118–19, 3140–41, 3141 n.222 (describing how in
the U.S. we assimilate the balancing step to the “less restrictive means” prong. The elision
lies in how courts will demand a less restrictive means, but fail to say whether the alternate
means would be “equally effective in carrying out the government’s legitimately relevant
interests, or instead that even if the [means] were less effective, [it] would be a sufficient
alternative given the relatively greater importance of [the right intruded upon.”). Jackson,
supra note 109, at 3118–19.
114
See Jackson, supra note 109, at 3094 (discussing other methods in the U.S.
constitutional tradition, like categorical rules). See also BARAK, supra note 110, at 493–527
(discussing methods like categorization or absolute rights, particularly as applied to a right’s
“core”).
115
See supra text accompanying notes 5–7.
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II. RIGHTS IN REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
STATUTES
Fundamental rights under U.S. substantive due process doctrine
receive strict scrutiny, as do certain First Amendment rights. 116 Vicki
Jackson has pointed out other areas of U.S. constitutional law, like Takings
doctrine, where proportionality is used.117 Fallon describes how strict
scrutiny in the form of “compelling interest” and “narrow tailoring”
requirements arose to privilege certain constitutional rights over other
constitutional values in the decades after the Lochner-era, when courts
were trying to both a) correct for a lopsided solicitude for economic
libertarian concerns (as I claim exists now in RIA domain) and b) render
meaningful the protection of some rights even amid an overall acceptance
of policy-tradeoffs (which the current vogue for CBA represents as well).118
Few proceed to note, however, that RIA requirements are also rife
with this three-part logic of heightened justification.
The scholarly attention in this erstwhile backwater of administrative
law has focused mostly on CBA and its critiques, chief among which is the
methodology’s insensitivity to non-fungible, non-utilitarian values. 119 But
it turns out that CBA is not the only kind of regulatory analysis that must
be routinely conducted. We have accrued a list of special burdens that
trigger their own procedural requirements and even substantive judicial
review. These RIA measures include the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA),
the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) as amended by the Small Business
Enforcement Regulatory Flexibility Act (SBERFA), the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), and the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).
Apart from these widely recognized RIAs, 120 my inventory includes a
number of less-canonical provisions that are similar in structure. The
Endangered Species Act permits burdens to biodiversity only under strict
conditions including those of fit and purpose. The Family Impact
Assessment, which applied for a few years in the late 1990’s, arguably
qualifies even though it was passed as a rider to an appropriations bill.
Some Executive Orders (EO’s) even resemble these rights-like RIAs,
despite the lack of judicial enforcement available for EO’s. 121 For instance,
116

See Fallon, supra note 111, at 1316–17.
See Jackson, supra note 109, at 3104–05.
118
See Fallon, supra note 111, at 1270.
119
See supra note 9.
120
MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RES. SERV., COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN
THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 2–15 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44813.pdf (including
these four in the discussion).
121
See PETER STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASE AND
117
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the Reagan-era EO 12630 (1988) required special assessment of regulatory
burdens on private property even when the scrutinized regulations did not
rise to the level of regulatory takings.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), passed in 1993, is
analogous because independently of the Constitution, it singles out certain
burdens as triggering heightened justification involving showings of fit and
purpose for valid regulatory or legislative action. The chief difference
between RFRA and the classic RIA is that such showings can be enforced
by the mechanism of judicial review. We shall, however, see that in the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, NEPA, Title II of UMRA, and the Endangered
Species Act, judicial review is available as well. 122
I argue that in each of these examples, we have elected to impose a
heightened justification requirement that has the structure of a right,
exhibiting three key elements 1) requiring sufficiency of purpose, 2)
demanding careful fit, and 3) conferring some degree of claim to
enforcement. Claimability may not rise to full judicial recourse but may
simply mean that individual beneficiaries have some procedural avenue for
demanding the promised justification such that they are plausibly
considered rights-holders as distinct from incidental beneficiaries.
Not all RIAs are rights-like, and some fall outside my model, as I
explain later.123 First, certain RIAs exhibit no vision of specific claimants.
They therefore resemble duties to the public-at-large far more than
rights.124 Single-sector impact assessments also fall outside the model. 125 I
discuss later why these impact assessments, which do not privilege the
value against all competing values, are also excluded from my catalog of
rights-like RIAs.126
For those examples that I contend do fall within the domain of rightslike impact assessments, I will demonstrate that each of the three rightsdistinguishing elements is present, although to varying degrees.
A. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
I start by examining the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C.
§3501 et seq. This legislation prohibits regulatory action that imposes
information collection without a procedural review of the paperwork
burden. The procedural review required under the PRA must be cleared
through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the Executive
COMMENTS 173–76, 213–29 (11th ed. 2011). See also, infra text accompanying note 327.
122
See infra Part III.F and III.G.
123
See infra Part III.F and III.G.
124
See infra Part III.F and accompanying notes 349–352.
125
See infra Part III.G and accompanying notes 353–357.
126
See infra Part III.G and accompanying notes 353–357.
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Office of the President.
Moreover, PRA, like many RIA measures, advances important hidden
purposes that are not reflected in the outward-facing title of the measure.
For instance, the PRA accomplishes the important task of authorizing the
Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) within the OMB.
This entity, which serves as a clearinghouse for regulations and certain
other administrative actions, has roots in a deregulatory agenda. 127
Whether it retains this cast today is in some dispute, 128 but the creation of
the OIRA, if nothing else, centralizes the Administration’s control over
regulations, a policy goal that does not necessarily coincide with paperwork
reduction. As we will see, hidden policy goals are a common feature
among the measures instituting RIAs.
1. Scope
Each of the RIAs I examine demands additional procedure and
heightened justification beyond background cost-benefit judgments. To
differentiate the especially encumbered actions from background
governmental action, we need some standard to determine when the
heightened scrutiny applies. The RIA procedures are only triggered based
on whether there is some threshold burden to the chosen value. The fact
that RIAs emphasize their “impact assessment” function derives in part
from the necessary assessment of threshold “impact” before the “right” of
heightened justification is triggered. Thus, I examine the threshold trigger,
or scope of application, of each RIA.
The PRA’s requirements are not triggered by paperwork, per se, but
by regulatory action imposing “information collection.” Information
collection is defined in the regulations as “[t]he obtaining, causing to be
obtained, soliciting, or requiring the disclosure to an agency, third parties
or the public of information . . . imposed on, ten or more persons.” and

127
See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Lieb, Regleprudence at OIRA and Beyond,
103 GEO. L. J. 259, 280, n.95, n.76 (2015) (describing Nixon’s deregulatory agenda as
crucial in the history of regulatory review). See also, Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years:
The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2011). See also Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and
Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1248 (1987) (recounting the origins of regulatory
analysis in the Nixon, then Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations.).
128
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2281–2319
(2001) (describing how the Clinton Administration used OMB and OIRA in a proregulatory way, including through the use of “prompt letters” and other Presidential
directives). See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs:
Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013). But see Lisa Heinzerling, Inside
EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the
Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 332 (2014) (discussing how the Obama
White House used OIRA to block regulatory action).
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“[i]ncludes any requirement or request for persons to obtain, maintain,
retain, report, or publicly disclose information.” 129 As we shall see, this
information collection could well occur electronically, without imposing
any “paperwork” at all, but such burden would still garner special
scrutiny.130
This condition upon agency information collection applies not only to
Cabinet-level agencies but independent regulatory agencies as well. 131
The provisions of the PRA impose a presumption against this type of
burden which must be surmounted by means of special justification
corresponding to the three features of rights. 132
2. Sufficiency of Purpose
Under 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c), “[E]ach agency shall . . . establish a
process . . . to review each collection of information . . . for ‘an evaluation
of the need for the collection of information.’” 133 The need must be
articulated in terms such as whether “the information has practical utility,”
according to the certification requirement under § 3506(c)(3)(A), and the
claim of “practical utility” must be subjected to public comment.134 Thus, a
declaration of utility and need, or in other words, “sufficient purpose,”
must be produced.
3. Fit
Meanwhile under 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2)(A) and (3)(A), the agency
must “[E]valuate whether the proposed collection of information is
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency.” 135
This requirement of necessity demands a level of means-ends fit between
the action imposing the burden and the purpose which it is meant to serve.
Section 3506(2)(A)(iv) tasks the agency with certifying whether it has
“minimize[d] the burden of the collection of information on those who are
to respond” ostensibly demanding the least-restrictive means.
The fit requirement is even more rigorous should the paperwork
burden fall on members of the special protectorate of small businesses.
129

5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c) (2019).
See infra text accompanying notes 152–159 (describing the E-Government Act of
2002 which amended and supplemented the PRA).
131
CAREY, supra note 120, at 14–15 (saying that “independent agencies, as well as
independent regulatory agencies” fall within the PRA’s coverage. By contrast, Executive
Orders, including those that impose default cost-benefit analysis requirements, do not
always reach independent or independent regulatory agencies.).
132
See supra Part I.
133
44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A)(i) (2018); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.5(d)(1)(iii) (2019).
134
44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2)(A)(i).
135
Id. § 3506(c)(2)(A), (3)(A) (emphasis added); § 3506(c)(3)(A).
130
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Section 3506(c)(3) obliges the agency not merely to “certify . . . that each
collection of information . . . (C) reduces . . . the burden [of information
collection] on persons . . . including with respect to small entities.” It also
proceeds to list specific mitigation measures for small businesses that could
be used to achieve this “reduc[tion] to the extent practicable and
appropriate,” such as different compliance standards, timetables, or
exemptions. 136 This additional specification increases the pressure for
some kind of exemption or special treatment of small entities in the
collection of information. This apparatus further illustrates the hidden
purposes and privileging of groups that may not be apparent from the
outward framing of the RIA measure. 137
PRA contains a rather strict mechanism forcing lookback tailoring of
even prior approved information collections. Under §3507(g), the OMB
Director “may not approve a collection of information for a period in
excess of 3 years.” Any extension would then require another process of
review. Meanwhile under § 3513, the OMB Director “shall periodically
review selected agency information resource management activities,” thus
serving as another channel of accountability for continual adjustment of fit
and monitoring for continued sufficiency of purpose. 138
4. Claiming
Under § 3508, the Director of OMB may provide “the agency and
other interested persons an opportunity to be heard, or to submit statements
in writing.” This hearing provision serves as one way for beneficiaries to
enlist someone, namely the OMB Director, to hold the agency to account
for the PRA requirements. Section 3508 admonishes that “[t]o the extent,
if any, that the Director determines that the collection of information by an
agency is unnecessary for any reason, the agency may not engage in the
collection of information.” The necessity determination, by the terms of §
3508, “includ[es] whether the information shall have practical utility.”
Thus, insufficient purpose or lack of means-ends rationality can be claimed
by a rights-holder in a hearing to invalidate the measure imposing a
paperwork burden.
This OMB hearing provision admittedly employs the permissive term
“may,” but another provision, § 3517(b) provides that “[a]ny person may
request the Director to review any collection of information conducted by
136

Id. § 3506(c)(3)(C)(i)–(iii).
I will later suggest that one “hidden” or “complementary” purpose of HIAs is equity
and will show how that can be built into the HIA. See infra text accompanying notes 377.
138
I will also later suggest that lookback monitoring for continued justification should
be built into HIAs so that existing arrangements can be subjected to HIA as well. See infra
text accompanying notes 391–395.
137
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or for an agency to determine, if, under this subchapter, a person shall
maintain, provide, or disclose the information to or for the agency. Unless
the request is frivolous, the Director shall . . . , respond to the request
within 60 days . . . and take appropriate remedial action, if necessary.”139
Moreover, persons can claim individualized immunities under § 3512,
the “Public Protection” provision of the PRA. The section stipulates that
“[n]o person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a
collection of information that is subject to this subchapter” if the agency
has not received OMB approval of its compliance with the PRA in the form
of a valid OMB control number. Under § 3512(b), “[t]he protection
provided by this section may be raised in the form of a complete defense,
bar, or otherwise at any time during the agency administrative process or
judicial action applicable thereto.” The PRA implementing regulations
apply this section to benefits conditional upon the information collection as
well: “the agency shall not treat a person’s failure to comply, in and of
itself, as grounds for withholding the benefit or imposing the penalty. The
agency shall instead permit respondents to prove or satisfy the legal
conditions in any other reasonable manner.”140
Apart from the normal administrative law requirement to take
comments into account, 141 the PRA statute insists under § 3507(d)(2) that
in the final rule, an agency “shall explain how any collection of information
contained in the final rule responds to the comments, if any, filed by the
Director or the public, or the reasons such comments were rejected.”142
Thus, the heightened justification requirement triggered by paperwork
burdens is arguably held and enforceable by individual members of the
public, rather than constituting a mere duty to uphold the collective good.
5. History
Freedom from paperwork was not a value suddenly elevated to this
privileged status without prior groundwork. It was originally recognized as
a concern in the Federal Reports Act of 1942, 143 but this legislation was
criticized in the 1970’s as ineffectual, and was finally superseded by the
PRA in 1980.144 Stuart Shapiro and Deanna Moran observe that the
interest groups supporting the PRA were principally businesses and state

139
44 U.S.C. § 3517 (b)(1)–(2) (emphasis added). See also 5 C.F.R. § 1320.14(c)
(2019).
140
5 C.F.R. § 1320.6(c).
141
See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products, 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
142
44 U.S.C. § 3507(d)(2).
143
Federal Reports Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-831, 56 Stat. 1078.
144
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812.
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and local governments.145 Meanwhile, the diffuse nature of the benefits
from paperwork meant that no interest group came forward and supported
its collection. 146
As Samaha notes, the PRA itself was followed by the Paperwork
Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986,147 then further amended in the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,148 the Economic Growth and
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996,149 the Government
Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998,150 and the Small Business Paperwork
Relief Act of 2002.151
This history suggests that any of the RIAs that are not now easily
classifiable as a form of subconstitutional “right” may still be a “right-inthe-making.”
Congress’ ongoing shaping of the PRA also injected additional or
supplementary values into the right. For instance, in 2002, Congress
passed the E-government Act of 2002, which exists now as a statutory note
to the provisions codifying the Paperwork Reduction Act. 152 This note
imposed a so-called “Privacy Impact Assessment” as an auxiliary to the
PRA requirements, and indeed they are often completed together as one
process.153 Section 208(b)(1)(A)(B) of the E-Government Act 154 requires
145

See Stuart Shapiro & Deanna Moran, The Checkered History of Regulatory Reform
Since the APA, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 161–62, 161 n.116, 162 n.124 (2016).
146
Id. at 161 n.113; see Tozzi, supra note 127, at 55 (President Carter himself signed
the PRA over the objections of his Cabinet).
147
Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat.
1783-335 (Title VIII, §§ 801–820 of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution).
148
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163.
149
Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code).
150
Government Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1701–10,
112 Stat. 2681, 2749–51 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3504 (2018)) (involving electronic
submissions).
151
Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-198, 116 Stat. 729
(codified in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.).
152
E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, Pub. L. No. 107347, 116 Stat. 2921; 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Waiver of Paperwork Reduction).
153
OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. PRESIDENT, M-03-22, OMB GUIDANCE FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS OF THE E-GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002 Attachment
A, § II(D) (2003) [hereinafter OMB Guidance Attachment A, § II(C)(2)],
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22/ (providing that agencies
undertaking new electronic information collections may conduct and submit the privacy
impact assessment [PIA] to OMB . . . jointly, and listing the items that must be then added
for PIA purposes, such as “a statement detailing the impact the proposed collection will
have on privacy” and “1. whether individuals are informed that providing the information is
mandatory or voluntary[;] 2. opportunities to consent, if any, to sharing and submission of
information[;] 3. how the information will be secured.”).
Certain procedures are also triggered under the E-government Act when there are no
“information collections” but simply upon procurement of an information system. Because
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that before “initiating a new collection of information that will be collected,
maintained, or disseminated using information technology; and (II)
includes any information in an identifiable form permitting . . . contacting
of a specific individual . . . each agency shall . . . conduct a privacy impact
assessment.”155
The privacy impact assessment also consists of requirements to
address sufficiency of purpose, i.e., “why the information is being
collected” and its “intended use.”156 Fit is demanded in the form of a
requirement to consider less-restrictive means, namely by addressing
“opportunities to consent . . . to sharing and submission of information”
and addressing “how the information will be secured.” 157
Also, to the extent that the electronic information collection results in
the maintenance of a “system of records” with individually identifiable
information, 158 that system of records is then governed by another regime,
the Privacy Act of 1974 which states, “[e]ach agency that maintains a
system of records shall maintain in its records only such information about
an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the
agency required to be accomplished by statute or by executive order.”159
The value of liberty from government-imposed paperwork is thus
elided with the value of privacy.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) as amended by the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (“SBREFA”) 160
The RFA, like the PRA, was modified by Congress, most notably by
the SBREFA in 1996. The RFA enshrines a different favored value,
namely small business freedom from economic burden. An agency
imposing such a burden must make a special showing of heightened
justification, and this justification is expressly subject to judicial review.

here I am interested in impact assessments that apply across a range of agency policymaking activity, not just, for instance, building IT systems, I de-emphasize the procurementrelated impact assessment in this discussion and focus on the privacy impact assessment
triggered by information collection.
154
E-Government Act § 208 (b)(1)(A)(ii)–(B)(i).
155
Id.
156
E-Government Act § 208 (b)(2)(B)(ii)(II)–(III); 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (Waiver of
Paperwork Reduction).
157
E-Government Act § 208(b)(2); 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note. See also OMB Guidance
Attachment A, § II(C)(2), supra note 153.
158
5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (4)–(5) (2018) (defining “system of records” and “record”).
159
Id. § 552a(e)(1).
160
Id. §§ 601–612.
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1. Scope
The RFA, like the PRA, applies to independent regulatory agencies as
well.161 For the justification requirements to attach though, a rule must
reach the threshold of having a “significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.” 162 Because these terms are malleable,
an agency head must certify if she finds that a rule does not meet those
standards and is therefore not subject to the analysis requirements. 163 As
discussed infra, this certification, which must be accompanied by a
statement of factual basis, is subject to judicial review. 164
Small entities are defined to include small businesses, small
nonprofits, and “small government jurisdictions.” 165
The RFA also applies to “interpretative rules” of the IRS, so long as
they are published in the Federal Register, and “only to the extent that such
interpretative rules impose on small entities a collection of information
requirement.”166 The concerns of the PRA and the RFA intertwine once
more, suggesting that many of these RIAs are part of an interconnected
agenda.
2. Sufficiency of Purpose
The initial regulatory analysis that must accompany the proposed rule
is called the initial “reg-flex.”167 In it, an agency must describe “reasons
why action by the agency is being considered.” 168 The agency must also
supply “a statement of the need for, and objectives of, the rule.” 169 These
showings must be made above and beyond the mere statement of the
“impact of the rule on small entities,” to which the required analysis
presumably could have been restricted and still have constituted a
“regulatory impact analysis.”
3. Fit
The initial reg-flex must also describe “any significant alternatives to
the proposed rule which accomplish the stated objectives . . . and which
minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on small
161

CAREY, supra note 120, at 13.
5 U.S.C. § 605(b).
163
Id.
164
Id. § 611(a)(2).
165
Id. § 601(3)–(6).
166
Id. § 603(a). See also Thomas O. Sargentich, The Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 123, 128 (1997).
167
Richard J Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory
Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 546 (1998).
168
5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(1).
169
Id. § 604(a)(1). See also id. § 603(b)(2).
162
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entities. 170 The statute then lists particular alternatives that should be
discussed including, “differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables,” “clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance,”
“use of performance rather than design standards” and “exemption.” 171
Agencies are therefore subject to a fairly stringent least-restrictive means
analysis. When the final rule is promulgated, each final “reg-flex” must
also include:
[A] description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the
significant economic impact on small entities . . . including a
statement of the . . . reasons for selecting the alternative
adopted . . . and why each one of the other significant
alternatives to the rule . . . was rejected. 172
The measure also imposes a lookback requirement. Each agency must
review its rules every ten years to see if they fall within the scope of the
RFA and whether they must be changed or rescinded “to minimize any
significant economic impact of the rules upon a substantial number of such
small entities.”173
4. Claiming
Small businesses must be notified so they have an opportunity to
comment, and § 604(a)(2) requires that the final reg-flex contain a
summary of comments and responses to those comments.
Initially, RFA did not separately authorize judicial review of agencies’
actions. Courts, however, would consider the contents of the reg-flex
analysis in determining whether the rule was “arbitrary and capricious”
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)174 SBREFA, passed by the
Gingrich Congress in 1996,175 added a judicial review provision. Small
entities can now go to court to challenge an agency’s actual analysis of
final rules, an agency’s threshold certification of no significant impact, and
the agency’s ten-year lookback review outcomes. 176 Relief can include a
deferment of enforcement against small entities, which is considerably
more favorable than the usual remand nonvacatur which leaves the
contested rule in place while the agency reconsiders the rule on remand. 177

170

Id. § 603(c).
Id. § 603(c)(1)–(4).
172
Id. § 604(a)(6).
173
Id. § 610.
174
See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 187–88 (6th Cir. 1986).
175
See Shapiro & Moran, supra note 145, at 142, 172.
176
5 U.S.C. § 611(a)(2) (giving jurisdiction “to review any claims of noncompliance
with §§ 601, 604, 605(b), 608(b) and 610”).
177
See Pierce, supra note 167, at 547–48.
171
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SBREFA also authorizes small entities to recover attorneys’ fees, 178 and
stipulates a right of intervention for the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration in any such action.179
The Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration acts as a representative for small businesses, and is
someone the agency promulgating the rule must also reach out to at key
points.180 With respect to three particularly villainized agencies, EPA,
OSHA, and now CFPB,181 the advocacy role of the Chief Counsel is
enlarged. She must convene a review panel for each EPA, OSHA, or
CFPB rule, 182 comprised of governmental officials and tasked with
consulting with individual representatives of affected small entities 183 to
review the initial reg-flex and proposed rule. 184 The language stipulates
that “where appropriate, the agency shall modify the proposed rule, the
initial regulatory flexibility analysis or the decision on whether an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis is required.” 185
This structure of
representative accountability exists alongside the canonically rights-based
framework of judicial review.
5. History
The RFA was enacted in 1980, itself a deregulatory moment.186 Then
in 1996, it was, as described, substantially amended to further favor small
businesses. 187 The political significance of SBREFA’s passage in 1996
extends beyond small business, gesturing toward the entire political agenda
of the anti-regulatory Gingrich-led Republican Revolution. A crucial part
of the agenda of the new Republican majority in that highly charged time
was regulatory reform,188 including measures that would have codified the

178

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121
§ 231, 110 Stat. 857, 862–63 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)).
179
5 U.S.C. § 612.
180
See, e.g., id. § 605(b) (notifying Chief Counsel of any certification of lack of
“significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities”); id. § 603(a)
(requiring transmittal of initial reg-flex to the Chief Counsel).
181
Id. § 609(b) (applying additional requirements for initial reg-flex by “covered
agencies”); id. § 609(d) (defining covered agency).
182
Id. § 609(b)(2)–(3).
183
Id. § 609(b)(2).
184
Id. § 609(b)(4).
185
5 U.S.C. § 609(b)(6).
186
See Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 213 (1982).
187
Regulatory Flexibility Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 864 (1996).
188
See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN
THE U.S. CONGRESS 110 (1997).
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default requirement of CBA.189 Indeed, this particular idea, sometimes
referred to as “the supermandate,” lingers to the present-day. 190 Despite the
significant political energy that the Gingrich Congress expended, their
omnibus regulatory reform bills were unable to overcome the opposition of
Democrats, including then-President Clinton. 191 SBREFA was among the
only pieces of the Republican agenda that did ultimately wend its way to
completion.
C. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)192
NEPA is the godparent of all regulatory analysis requirements. 193
Passed in 1969 and signed by Richard Nixon on January 1, 1970, it requires
agencies to “include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement . . . on . . . the
environmental impact of the proposed action.” 194 In effect, it made
“environmental protection a part of the mandate of every federal agency
and department.”195
1. Scope
The condition of a detailed statement applies to “every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.”196
“Significantly affecting” is not defined in the statute, but NEPA
regulations contain a device for how to make this threshold determination.
Agencies must conduct Environmental Assessments (EAs) which “briefly
provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare

189

See also, Pierce supra note 167, at 546.
See e.g., Portman-Heitkamp Regulatory Accountability Act, S. 951, 115 th Cong. §
3(b)(5) (2017).
191
See SINCLAIR, supra note 188, at 110–13.
192
42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2018).
193
See McGarity, supra note 127, at 1247 (noting that “[t]he idea that agencies should
prepare a separate regulatory analysis document describing the costs and benefits of
proposed and final rules and credible rule-making alternatives probably originated with the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969”).
194
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) § 102(1)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(1)(C)(i).
195
CalvertCliff’s Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
196
42 U.S.C. § 4332(1)(C). Lookback review might not be available in the sense that
previously approved major federal actions do not continue to be subject to this procedural
burden for continued effect, even if the environmental circumstances of those prior actions
have changed. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004).
190
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an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact.” 197
Thus, some minimal environmental assessment is necessary in order to
determine whether a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must be
conducted. The device of the “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI) is
the flip-side of the EIS in the sense that if an EA concludes in a FONSI,
then an EIS does not need to be conducted. 198 Sometimes substantive
environmental mitigation commitments are made at this stage to obtain
what is called a “mitigated FONSI” and thereby avoid the EIS process. 199
EA’s and FONSI’s are also subject to judicial review. 200
2. Sufficiency of Purpose
Unlike its RIA progeny, the NEPA statute does not require an analysis
of sufficiency of purpose in so many words. The regulations interpreting
NEPA do, however. A decision contrary to the most environmentally
preferable alternative must be described in terms of the other “economic
and technical considerations and agency statutory missions . . . including
any essential considerations of national policy” that weighed against the
environmentally preferable alternative. 201 This language requires that the
countervailing factors be weighty.
3. Fit
The NEPA statute does specifically demand a showing of fit. The
agency must articulate in its detailed statement under § 4332(1)(C) “any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented.”202 Moreover, it must describe “alternatives to the
proposed action.”203 This language has been interpreted as a procedural
requirement to consider, though not necessarily adopt, less environmentally
damaging alternatives.204 The regulations interpreting NEPA, however, do
require that the decisionmaker record the environmentally preferable
alternative, and then describe how the agency decided against this
alternative based on the weighty purposes described above. 205
197

40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2019).
Id. § 1508.13.
199
Bradley Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 935 (2002).
200
See Save Our Ten Acres (SOTA) v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973).
201
40 C.F.R. § 1505.2.
202
National Environmental Protection Act § 202(1)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1)(C)(ii)
(2018).
203
Id. § 4332(1)(C)(iii).
204
See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519,
558 (1978).
205
40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (requiring a “Record of Decision,” or “ROD”).
198
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4. Claiming
While NEPA did not include an express judicial review provision,
courts have reviewed for NEPA compliance using APA § 702. 206 Courts
apply a “hard look” standard to judge an agency’s execution of its
obligations under NEPA, 207 and a regulation can be enjoined if the
agency’s performance of these functions is so inadequate that the
regulation is thereby and capricious.208 Moreover, mitigation measures
adopted as a condition of the FONSI are judicially enforceable. 209
5. History
NEPA does not simply establish an impact assessment requirement.
There are important non-obvious purposes hitched to NEPA as well. The
measure created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), within the
Executive Office of the President (EOP), with duties to assist and advise
the President on the quality of the environment across the various
“programs and activities of the Federal Government.”210 NEPA created a
Science Advisory Board which must be consulted on proposed criteria,
standards, limitations, or regulations under a range of environmental
statutory authorities. These institution-building provisions in NEPA
elevate environmental issues within the White House211 and subject
environmental regulation to across-the-board involvement by the Science
Advisory Board.
NEPA has proven surprisingly enduring. Congressional amendment
has been fairly minor,212 although many new laws that Congress passes
contain NEPA exemptions.213
CEQ promulgated binding NEPA
regulations in the late 1970s, but on the authority of President Carter’s
206

See, e.g., Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1353–54
(9th Cir. 1994) (where the justiciability of compliance with NEPA was conceded precisely
on the question of whether the consideration of human health effects—albeit measured by
methods other than HIA—were adequate to satisfy NEPA requirements).
207
See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen’s Council, 490 U.S. 332, 338 (1989);
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976).
208
See, e.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 106
(1983); Coeur D’Alene Lake v. Kiebert, 790 F. Supp. 998, 1010 (D. Idaho 1992); see
generally Nicholas C. Yost, The Background and History of NEPA, NEPA LITIG. GUIDE
(Ferlo et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
209
Tyler v. Cisneros, 136 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1998).
210
42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2018).
211
See Yost, supra note 108, at 1.
212
Bradley Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 336 n.14 (2004).
213
See, e.g., Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 205 n.9 (1998) (counting the
number of exceptions to NEPA authorized by Congress by the year 1997, and finding 28);
see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and Recruitment in
Environmental Law, 20 ENVTL. L. 485, 496 (1990).
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Executive Order 11,991, rather than on the basis of statutorily delegated
rulemaking authority.214 These regulations have operated through the
decades, despite being based on what one observer describes as “such a
shaky legal foundation.”215 NEPA, which declares a Congressional policy
of “recogniz[ing] that each person should enjoy a healthful
environment,”216 has achieved a degree of entrenchment. Indeed, one
commentator notes, “If environmental law has a superstatute, it is the
procedural NEPA,”217 referencing the notion that certain laws attain a status
of popular acceptance and entrenchment such that they become durable
normative fixtures exerting influence beyond ordinary legislation. 218
Indeed, this capsule history of NEPA supports the argument that RIAs are
instruments of popular struggle to inscribe conceptions of rights in extraconstitutional space.
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)219
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) was passed in 1995
and imposes heightened scrutiny on the uncompensated economic burdens
that subnational governments shoulder because of federal mandates. A
“federal intergovernmental mandate,” the target of UMRA, is defined as
“any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation that would impose an
enforceable duty upon State, local or tribal governments . . . or would
reduce or eliminate the amount of authorization of appropriations for . . .
the purpose of complying with any such previously imposed duty.” 220
What is notable about UMRA is that it applies to legislation. 221 Title I of
214
Exec. Order No. 11,991 (“EO”), 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (2018). The EO directs agencies
to “comply with the regulations issued by [CEQ] except where such compliance would be
inconsistent with statutory requirements.” Id. § 2(g).
215
See Karkkainen, supra note 212, at 336.
216
National Environmental Protection Act § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (2018).
217
See, e.g., Jedidiah Purdy, Coming into the Anthropocene, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1619,
1619 (2016); see also Arthur W. Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the
Licensing Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace?, 72 COLUM.
L. REV. 963, 963 (1972) (describing NEPA as an “environmentalist Magna Carta”).
218
See generally ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2013).
219
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) § 2, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2018) and
scattered sections.
220
Id. § 658(5). This definition is simplified for exposition purposes here. The
definition features certain economic thresholds as well, and a number of exclusions,
including a complex partial exclusion of conditions on spending, which are differentiated
from conditional provisions attached to entitlement programs. Statutes imposing federal
intergovernmental mandates trigger reporting requirements, but these are only enforceable
above a certain economic threshold. Id. Also, in the process of bill passage, an amendment
was added such that federal mandates upon the private sector (rather than just upon
subnational governments) would also trigger scrutiny. Id. § 658(6)–(7); see infra note 269.
221
See Unfunded Mandate Reform Act § 202, 2 U.S.C. § 1532.
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the Act addresses legislative action, and Title II concerns regulatory action.
I discuss Title II first, and then return to Title I.
1. Regulatory Sufficiency of Purpose
Title II applies to proposed rulemaking “likely to result in
promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may result
in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or the private sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for
inflation) in any one year.”222
Such actions must be accompanied by a § 202 written statement of
“anticipated . . . benefits . . . as well as the effect of the Federal mandate on
health, safety, and the natural environment,” or in other words, a statement
of sufficient purpose.223 Health is anticipated to be a governmental purpose
that can compete with and burden the favored value of state and local
economic freedom.
2. Regulatory Fit
UMRA § 205 clearly states that “the agency shall identify and
consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and from those
alternatives select the . . . least burdensome alternative that achieves the
objective of the rule.”224 This fit requirement permits the presumption
against intergovernmental burden to be overcome only in two
circumstances: first, with an explanation by the head of the relevant
agency, or second, if these “provisions are inconsistent with law.” 225
3. Regulatory Claiming
The agency must engage in “consultation with elected representatives
of the affected State, local, and tribal governments” 226 and the § 202 written
statement must describe this consultation when the rule is promulgated. 227
Such written statement must also include a summary of comments with the
agency’s responses. 228 Again, this type of provision provides affected
entities with some protected expectation of participation.
In fact, this expectation turns out to be enforceable under UMRA §
401(a). According to that section, “compliance or noncompliance . . . with
the [written statement] provisions of . . . [§] 202” are subject to judicial
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Id. § 1532(a).
Id. § 1532(a)(2).
Id. § 1535(a).
Id. § 1535(b).
Id. § 1532.
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act § 202, 2 U.S.C. § 1532(b).
Id. §§ 1532(a)(5)(A)–(C).
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review within 180 days of promulgation. Though the “sufficiency of
purpose” requirement is subject to judicial review, the fit requirements of §
205 do not seem to be within the scope of this provision, since they are
contained in § 205, rather than § 202. 229 The review that is provided under
this section is described as APA § 706(1) review, namely, review to
“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 230
Because any enforcement action would concern whether the agency
complied with the statement requirement, the remedy could consist merely
of judicial order that the agency prepare the statement. By the terms of the
judicial review provision itself, “inadequacy or failure to prepare such [a]
statement . . . shall not be used as a basis for staying, enjoining,
invalidating, or otherwise affecting such agency rule.” 231 Moreover, a rule
of construction tacked on at the end of the section disingenuously disclaims
the creation of “any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,” 232
presumably weakening the strength of judicial enforcement available under
the regulatory accountability provisions of UMRA.
4. Legislative Sufficiency of Purpose
I now return to the portion of UMRA that applies to legislative action.
Under Title I, when a Congressional committee reports out legislation that
includes “any Federal mandates,” the legislation must be accompanied by a
reporting of not only costs anticipated in the first five fiscal years, but also
the “benefits anticipated from the Federal mandates (including the effects
on health and safety and the protection of the natural environment).” 233
Such a declaration of benefit could be understood as a requirement to state
a sufficient purpose for the imposition of the federal mandate.
What leaps out about this § 423(c) committee reporting duty is that no
point of order is available to enforce this requirement. 234 UMRA amended
229

Id. §§ 1571(a)(1)–(2), (5).
Id.
231
Id. § 1571(a)(3).
232
Id. § 1571(b)(2).
233
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Congressional Budget
Act) §§ 423(c)(1)–(2), (as amended by Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §
658d(c)(1)–(2) (2018)). Congressional Budget Act § 423(c), 2 U.S.C. § 658c, assigns a duty
to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to estimate the cost of federal mandates in
proposed legislation.
234
Congressional Budget Act § 423(f) requirement for a CBO estimate to accompany
the committee reported bill is protected by point of order. Budget Act § 425(a)(1) says that
“[i]t shall not be in order in the Senate or the House of Representatives to consider (1) any
bill or joint resolution that is reported by a committee unless the committee has published a
statement of the Director on the direct costs of Federal mandates in accordance with [section
423(f)] before such consideration.” 2 U.S.C. § 658d(A)(1). But this section does not
mention the need to accord with § 423(c), which contains the other committee reporting
requirements.
230
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a two-decade old law, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974, often referred to as the “Congressional Budget Act of 1974.”
UMRA inserted many of its requirements directly into the framework of
the Congressional Budget Act.235 Indeed the section number used to
signify this obligation, § 423, refers to the section of the Congressional
Budget Act added by UMRA containing this committee reporting duty in
subsection (c).
As a general matter, Congress’ overall budgeting framework is
enforced by an elaborate system of points of order.236 After all, for
Congress’ budget to have meaning, it must impose consequences for the
passage of laws that exceed the budget. 237 The Congressional Budget Act
thus subjects such budget non-conforming legislation to a point of order
that any member of Congress can raise. 238 To proceed with the legislation
once such an objection has been raised, the relevant house must waive the
implicated rule,239 a step which according to the Congressional Budget Act
framework, requires a supermajority vote. 240
The UMRA committee reporting requirement under § 423, however,
is not subject to a point of order. 241 Even if it were, the regular committee
process is increasingly a relic of the past as many bills in our hyperpolarized political context are steered by leadership directly to the floor. 242
These circumstances do not mean that UMRA is unenforceable as
applied to legislation. UMRA contains a second tier of requirements apart
from § 423. Section 425 of the UMRA-amended Congressional Budget
Act imposes an even stronger condition upon significant mandates
exceeding an economic threshold (roughly $50 million in direct costs) and

235

Congressional Budget and Impoundment and Control Act of 1974 is often referred to
as the “Congressional Budget Act of 1974,” 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–88.
236
Christina S. Ho, Budgeting on Autopilot: Do Sequestration and the Independent
Payment Advisory Board Lock-In Status Quo Majority Advantage?, 50 TULSA L. REV. 695,
716 (2015).
237
Id. at 716–17.
238
Congressional Budget Act §§ 302(f)(1)–(2); 2 U.S.C. §§ 633(f)(1)–(2).
239
Bill Heniff, Jr., Overview of the Authorization-Appropriations Process, CONG. RES.
SERV. 1, 2 (2012),
https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/d2b1dc6f-4ed2-46ae-83ae1e13b3e24150.pdf.
240
While usually only a majority vote is required to override the ruling of a chair when
such ruling is appealed to the whole Senate, some points of order under the budget process
require 60 votes to waive. 2 U.S.C. § 621 note; see Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the
Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 KAN.
L. REV. 1113, 1174 (1997).
241
See UMRA § 425(a)(1), 2 U.S.C. § 658d(a)(1) (by contrast subjecting the CBO
reporting requirement, as opposed to the committee reporting requirement, to a point of
order).
242
Garrett, supra note 240, at 1142.
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this condition, if not met, is vulnerable to a point of order. 243 The point of
order, unlike some others within the Congressional Budget Act, requires a
mere majority to overcome. 244 Various aspects of the § 425 condition are
discussed below, but it requires, roughly speaking, some indication that the
mandate’s burdens will be mitigated. 245 While this point of order does not
apply expressly to the absence of sufficient purpose for the mandate, one
could view a vote to overcome the point of order as a legislative
determination that the purpose of legislation containing the unfunded
mandate is sufficient to overcome the presumption. 246 Forcing a separate
vote on this issue alone can be viewed as a requirement of extra clarity on
the sufficiency of purpose to infringe on the favored value of states’
economic freedom. 247
5. Legislative Fit
As we mentioned in discussing Title II of UMRA earlier, before
promulgating a rule for which a written statement is required, “the agency
shall . . . consider . . . [and] select the . . . least burdensome alternative.”248
At first glance, the articulation of a similar fit requirement is not a
condition for a legislative intergovernmental mandate, especially one
protected by the less enforceable § 423(c) committee reporting obligation.
This initial impression, however, gives way on closer inspection, as we
describe later.249 Oddly, for a legislative private mandate, the committee
report must include “a description of the actions, if any, taken by the
committee to avoid any adverse impact on the private sector.”250 But this
requirement does not apply to a legislative intergovernmental mandate.
Like RFA, UMRA establishes a private protectorate whose economic
interests are procedurally differentiated.
Yet, the real enforcement cudgel, the point-of-order under § 425 of
the Congressional Budget Act, applies only to intergovernmental
243

Congressional Budget Act § 425(a)(2) (as amended by UMRA), 2 U.S.C. §
658d(a)(2).
244
Garrett, supra note 240, at 1161 (explaining that a majority vote is needed to sustain
a ruling of the chair to overrule the point of order, or to appeal a ruling of the chair
sustaining the point of order, or voting on the point of order even if the Chair has declined to
rule). Garrett, supra note 240, at 1162.
245
See Congressional Budget Act § 425(a), (B)(iii)(bb), 2 U.S.C. §§ 658d(a)(2),
(B)(iii)(bb).
246
See Garrett, supra note 240, at 1165–66.
247
See generally William Eskridge & Philip Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
248
2 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (2018).
249
See Congressional Budget Act §§ 425(a)(2)(A), (B)(iii)(I)(bb), 2 U.S.C. §§
658d(a)(2)(A), (B)(iii)(I)(bb).
250
See Congressional Budget Act §§ 423(c)(3); 2 U.S.C. §§ 658b(3).
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mandates. 251 Despite a lack of specific language in Title I, close
consideration reveals that fit requirements do apply to these $50 millionplus intergovernmental mandates.
The requirement is apparent once one realizes that by default the “less
burdensome alternative,” or the means by which the mandate burden is to
be minimized, is through federal funding. UMRA certainly requires
declaration of either funding or mandate mitigation for legislation to
constitute a “funded” rather than “unfunded” mandate and thereby escape
the point of order. For instance, § 425(a)(2)(A) and (B) lists conditions
exempting legislation from the point of order. Subparagraph (A) exempts
legislation if it provides new budget authority, entitlement, or spending
authority to cover the mandate.252 Subparagraph (B) stipulates that the
conditions necessary to avoid a point of order are satisfied if the bill
authorizes sufficient appropriations, and provides some assurance that the
amount will be appropriated.253 To meet this requirement, legislation could
include a circuit-breaker that kicks in whenever appropriations fall short to
“implement a less costly mandate or mak[e] such mandate ineffective for
the fiscal year.”254
Even when federal intergovernmental mandates miss the $50 million
direct-costs threshold and are therefore not subject to § 425 and its
accompanying point of order, the § 423 committee report must contain “a
statement of whether the committee intends that the Federal
intergovernmental mandates be partly or entirely unfunded, and if so, the
reasons for that intention.”255
Lookback review is built into UMRA. If within ten years, the
implementing agency re-estimates the mandate’s costs and they prove to be
higher, the agency must notify Congress with recommendations for
mitigation or lapse of the mandate’s burden. 256 Garrett also notes,
“Congress has the authority under the Act to request CBO to perform
follow-up studies.”257
6. Legislative Claiming
The point of order provides accountability for the heightened
legislative criteria of § 425, which can be understood as requirements for
251

See Congressional Budget Act § 425(a)(2), 2 U.S.C. § 658d(a)(2).
Congressional Budget Act §§ 425(a)(2)(A), (B)(iii)(I)(bb), 2 U.S.C. §§
658d(a)(2)(A), (B)(iii)(I)(bb).
253
Congressional Budget Act § 425(a)(2)(B), 2 U.S.C. § 658d(a)(2)(B).
254
Congressional Budget Act § 425(a)(2)(B)(iii)(I)(bb), 2 U.S.C. §
658d(a)(2)(B)(iii)(I)(bb).
255
Congressional Budget Act § 423(d)(1)(B), 2 U.S.C. § 658b(d)(1)(B).
256
Congressional Budget Act § 425(a)(2)(B)(iii), 2 U.S.C. §§ 658d(a)(2)(B)(i), (iii).
257
Garrett, supra note 240, at 1160.
252
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extra clarity by Congress with respect to sufficiency of purpose and fit. If
there is no funding or no funding mitigation expressly indicated for a
federal mandate above the threshold, 258 a point of order can be raised, thus
requiring the clarity of a vote on the sufficiency of the mandate’s purpose
to overcome the unfunded mandate objection. 259
Any state can thus have its representative delegation make a “claim”
on its behalf, if one subscribes to the “political safeguards of federalism”
view of how elected Senators relate to their states.260 The point of order
can only be overcome by majority vote, which remains politically
consequential insofar as it forces a separate roll call vote requiring
Members of Congress to take a visible stance on that particular issue. 261
Furthermore, the Senate has on occasion voted to raise that threshold to
sixty votes. 262 While that threshold reverted back to simple majority in
subsequent fiscal years, the threat of elevation in any given year remains.263
Another feature of UMRA that suggests that the enforcement
mechanism treats subnational governments as rights-holders rather than
mere beneficiaries of an otherwise structural public duty, is that those
enforcement provisions can be “waived” or at least go voluntarily
unclaimed by states and localities, consistent with H.L.A. Hart’s account of
choice-rights.264
Section 425(b) contains the following rule of
construction:
258
Congressional Budget Act § 424(a)(1), 2 U.S.C. § 658c(a)(1) (imposing a $50
million per fiscal year threshold for intergovernmental mandates). Congressional Budget
Act § 424(b), 2 U.S.C. § 658c(b)(1) (setting the threshold at $100 million for private
mandates).
259
Garrett, supra note 240, at 1161–68 (detailed description of the mechanics and
incentive structure behind points of order generally and UMRA points of order in
particular).
260
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954);
see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 184 (1980).
261
Garrett, supra note 240, at 1161, 1163–64; see also Elizabeth Garrett, Framework
Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1496, 1503–04 (2008).
262
H. Con. Res. 95, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted) https://www.congress.gov/bill/109thcongress/house-concurrent-resolution/95 (the fiscal year 2006 budget resolution). The
Senate also included a supermajority threshold in an early version of the fiscal year 2010
budget resolution, S. Amdt. 819 (Enzi) to S. Con. Res. 13, 111th Cong. (2009)
https://www.congress.gov/amendment/111th-congress/senate-amendment/819?s=a&r=162.
This change, however, dropped out before the budget resolution was finalized.
263
See id.; see also Robert Jay Dilger, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History,
Impact,
and
Issues,
CONG. RES. SERV. 1,
17 (Aug.
28,
2019),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20190828_R40957_03df232a05ad57fb108a129a6c0c
8d50e45ad445.pdf.
264
Congressional Budget Act § 425(b), 2 U.S.C. § 658d(b) (2018). For a view that a
rights-holder is one who can waive the right, see H.L.A. Hart, Legal Rights, in ESSAYS ON
BENTHAM : STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 162, 186 (1982).
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The provisions [of this subsection] shall not be construed to
prohibit or otherwise restrict a State, local, or tribal government
from voluntarily electing to remain subject to the original
Federal intergovernmental mandate, complying with the
programmatic or financial responsibilities of the original Federal
intergovernmental mandate and providing the funding
necessary.265
7. History
In the floor debates over UMRA, Democratic politicians voiced
“concerns that the legislation would impede the federal government’s
ability to protect public health,”266 while the allies of the so-called
intergovernmental lobby were vocal in support. 267 But business groups
were also strong UMRA proponents, condemning environmental laws such
as the Clean Air Act as examples of unfunded federal mandates. 268 The
constituency favoring UMRA (states and small business, supported by big
business) was quite similar to the constituency backing the RFA. 269 It is
perhaps not so surprising then that non-federalism-related purposes
burrowed their way into UMRA by amendment, imposing “private-sector
cost impact statements when the economic burdens [exceed] 100 million
USD.”270 UMRA thus elevates private economic freedom as well.
III. OTHER EXAMPLES OF SIMILAR LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY
HEIGHTENED JUSTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
Here I wish to argue for the similarity of a few additional measures
imposing heightened justification requirements. By now I hope it is
evident that these heightened justification requirements exist on some kind
of quasi-rights continuum, and I make the case here for these other
examples as points on the same spectrum.
A. Endangered Species Act (ESA)
Although the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is not primarily
considered an impact assessment requirement, it shares features of the
subconstitutional rights we have examined. It constitutes an RIA insofar as
265

2 U.S.C. § 425(b).
Shapiro & Moran, supra note 145, at 167 (citing Dilger, supra note 263). Senator
Frank Lautenberg protested that OSHA and EPA would be hampered in their ability to set
minimum standards to address the collective action problems of a patchwork regime. Id.
267
Garrett, supra note 240, at 1136.
268
Shapiro & Moran, supra note 145, at 168.
269
Id. at 169.
270
See S. Amdt. 19 (Kempthorne) to S. 1, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted) https://www.con
gress.gov/amendment/104th-congress/senate-amendment/19/all-info.
266
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an assessment of an agency’s potential impact on endangered species is
necessary in order to determine whether the ESA’s strictly conditioned
bans on federal action apply. Accordingly, ESA obligations include
required biological assessments under § 7(c), as well as opinions specifying
impact as part of the § 7(a)(4) written statements issued by the Secretary of
Interior or Secretary of Commerce incident to required consultation by the
acting agency. 271
ESA § 7(a)(2) commands:
“Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with . . . the
Secretary, insure that any action . . . by such agency . . . is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of habitat of such species which is
determined . . . to be critical.”272
Any agency action that burdens these values in this way can only
proceed if it has been granted an exemption, which in turn depends on
sufficiency of purpose and fit.
1. Scope
The ESA actually features two thresholds of burden to species
preservation. Section 7(a)(3) requires consultation with the Secretary over
“prospective agency action . . . if the applicant has reason to believe that an
endangered species or a threatened species may be present in the area
affected by his project and that implementation of such action will likely
affect such species.”273
By contrast, the previously mentioned § 7(a)(2) has a higher
threshold; namely, agency action that is “likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.”274 But this
paragraph also places a correspondingly heavier requirement, beyond mere
consultation, upon agency actions that reach the higher threshold of
impingement upon the favored value. Such impingement forces an agency
to obtain an “exemption” from the § 7(a)(2) prohibition through prescribed
procedures. An exemption involves formal hearings and votes of the multimember committee, 275 colloquially called the “God Squad,” 276 hinging
271

Endangered Species Act (ESA) § 7(a), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)–(d) (2018).
ESA § 7(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4)
273
ESA § 7(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3) (emphasis added).
274
ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (emphasis added).
275
ESA § 7(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (listing in subparagraph (3) the seven members of
the “God Squad”); ESA § 7(h), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h); ESA § 7(h) (listing the requirement
that “the Committee shall make a final determination whether or not to grant an
exemption . . . by a vote of not less than five of its members,” and then articulating the
272
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upon certain substantive showings such as sufficiency of purpose and fit. 277
2. Sufficiency of Purpose
Section 7(h)(1)(A) provides that voting committee members may
grant exemptions on the basis of determinations that “the action is of
regional or national significance,” 278 that “such agency action is in the
public interest,” and that “the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the
benefits of alternative courses of action.” 279
These formulations all amount to a finding that the purpose of the
action is sufficient to justify an exemption.
3. Fit
Section 7(h)(1)(A)(i) also lists a fit requirement as one of the
determinations required for the committee member to vote in favor of an
exemption. Specifically, the impingement upon endangered species by the
agency must be justified by a Committee determination that “there are no
reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action.” 280 Section
7(h)(1)(B) goes on to require that the Committee granting the exemption
must:
[E]stablis[h] such reasonable mitigation and enhancement
measures, including, but not limited to, live propagation,
transplantation, and habitat acquisition and improvement, as are
necessary and appropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the
agency action upon the endangered species, threatened species,
or critical habitat concerned. 281
4. Claiming
Section 7(n) grants judicial review under the APA, of any decision of
the Endangered Species Committee under subsection (h), 282 though with
notorious standing limitations.283 The statute also provides for attorney’s
fees.284

determinations that must be made to justify such a vote).
276
See Jared des Rosiers, Exemption Process Under the Endangered Species Act: How
the God Squad Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 833 n.55 (1991).
277
ESA § 7(h)(1)(A)–(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)–(B).
278
ESA § 7(h)(1)(A)(iii), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(iii).
279
ESA § 7(h)(1)(A)(ii), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii).
280
ESA § 7(h)(1)(A)(i), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i).
281
ESA § 7(h)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(B).
282
ESA § 7(n), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n).
283
See Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
284
See ESA § 11(g)(2)(C)(3)(B)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(C)(3)(B)(4).
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5. History
Indeed, the court has intervened to enforce these species-preservation
norms, with TVA v. Hill serving as a vivid reminder.285 The Court held that
the statute forbade cost-benefit balancing in a way that prompted Sunstein
to muse that “perhaps the [ESA] is best taken to be rooted in a theory of
rights, one that rebuts the presumption in favor of cost-benefit
balancing.”286 The God Squad has rarely found occasion to overcome the
ESA’s protections,287 though occasionally agencies engage in negotiations
over discretionary decisions such as whether to designate or list a relevant
species or habitat, or whether “jeopardy” to the relevant species is found. 288
But this anomalously stringent subconstitutional provision was, like
other quasi-rights on this list, the result of a decades-long struggle to
entrench biodiversity as a favored value. The Endangered Species
Preservation Act enacted in 1966 merely provided a means of listing native
species with limited protections. 289 It was amended in 1969, and only
assumed its current form in 1973. The provisions were then weakened five
years later with the allowance of exemptions from the ESA’s protections
through the “God Squad” process described above. 290 Major amendments
have since passed and Congress has periodically intruded to grant relief for
those who sought to overcome this presumptive protection of endangered
species without prevailing in the God Squad process. 291
B. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)292
1. History
RFRA arose in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.

285

See 437 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1978) (applying the ESA strictly according to its own
terms to enjoin a 100 million USD project for the sake of protecting a critical habitat for a
snail darter).
286
CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST -BENEFIT STATE 68 (2002); see also Amy Sinden, In
Defense of Absolutism, Combating the Power of Politics in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 1405, 1410–11 (2005) (also characterizing the absolutism of the ESA as a rightsapproach).
287
See Sinden, supra note 286, at 1504 (observing that the committee has “convened on
only a handful of occasions in the quarter century since its creation, and even in those rare
instances, it has never granted a wholesale exemption from the ESA’s protections”).
288
Id. at 1504–05.
289
Endangered Species Act: A History of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, U.S. FISH
& WILDLIFE SERV. (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/laws-policies/esahistory.html.
290
Sinden, supra note 286, at 1504–05.
291
Id. at 1506–07.
292
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2018).
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Smith.293 Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court under the Free Exercise Clause
of the Constitution applied strict scrutiny294 not only to laws that target
religion but also to laws that are “neutral toward” 295 and only incidentally
burden religion.296 By analogy, I argue in this article that generally
applicable laws not targeted at health per se, but which burden health
nonetheless, should receive HIA scrutiny.
The Smith decision in 1990 was a pivot for the Supreme Court. 297
Two individuals were fired for ceremonially ingesting peyote thereby
violating employer and state-imposed drug restrictions.298 Because Smith
and Black were fired for misconduct, just as Sherbert was fired for refusal
to work on Saturdays, they did not qualify for unemployment benefits. 299
The general criminal prohibition on drug use and possession was plainly
neutral to religion and applied to all individuals regardless of religion. 300
Therefore, according to Justice Scalia writing for a 6–3 majority, the
compelling interest and least restrictive means test was not triggered. 301
Religious minority interests could seek protection in the general horsetrading of the political process and would not otherwise be singled out for
special justification of any incidental burden. 302
Congress, in RFRA, re-imposed strict scrutiny, requiring a showing of
compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means for generally
applicable laws that substantially burdened “a person’s exercise of
religion.”303
Here, we examine RFRA insofar as the heightened
justification for federal actions parallels other regulatory analysis
requirements.

293
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable
laws that impose a substantial burden on the practice of religion); see also 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb(a)(2)–(4); §2000bb–1(a).
294
See e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
295
This phrase is used in the Congressional findings for RFRA, 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb(a)(2); § 2000bb(a)(4).
296
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
297
The decision was presaged by Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
298
494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
299
Id.
300
Id. at 878.
301
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
302
Id. at 902.
303
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–1(a), (b) (2018). Though City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997), partially invalidated RFRA insofar as Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment power
was deemed insufficient to authorize the imposition of RFRA upon the states, Congress
restored some state applications of RFRA in the form of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), relying on Congress’ Commerce and Spending
Powers instead. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
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2. Scope
RFRA, like UMRA, covers both legislative and regulatory activity,
declaring that “[t]his chapter applies to all Federal law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether
adopted before or after November 16, 1993.”304 RFRA evidently
contemplates lookback application as well. 305
But not every regulation or statute is captured insofar as the law must
still qualify as one that “substantially burdens a person’s exercise of
religion.” This parameter mirrors other RIA threshold requirements.
NEPA kicks in only when a “major federal action significantly affects the
quality of the human environment,” and the RFA is triggered if a rule will
have “a significant economic effect on a substantial number of small
entities.”306
The threshold term, “exercise of religion” is defined in the statute as
“any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by or central to, a
system of religious belief.”307 The threshold term “substantial burden,”
however, is not further specified in the statute and has been contested in
court.308
3. Sufficiency of Purpose
The “sufficiency of purpose” that a law must display in order to
justify substantial burden on religious exercise is manifestly required. The
statute prevents such burden unless “that application of the burden to the
person . . . is in furtherance of a compelling government interest.”309
4. Fit
RFRA’s demand for fit in the event of government action
countervailing religious liberty is also readily apparent. The government
must demonstrate that the burdening measure is “the least restrictive means
304

Id. § 2000bb–3(a).
Some would argue that the “lookback” application is the only portion of RFRA on
sound constitutional footing.
See, e.g., Branden Lewiston, RFRA as Legislative
Entrenchment, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 26, 26 (2017).
306
See supra text accompanying note 160.
307
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2(4) (referencing § 2000cc–5).
308
See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (concluding that the
condition that for-profit employers who offer health insurance include mere coverage of
certain contraception options, whose use is within the election of the employees themselves,
in order to enjoy a tax benefit for offering health benefits voluntarily was not so attenuated
as to fail the “substantial burden” threshold). Observers have noted that the substantial
burden test was thereby defined down to virtually nothing. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Free
Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1497 (2015) (stating the substantial burden
test merely required “‘plaintiffs’ assertions that a law imposes a substantial burden”).
309
42 U.S.C § 2000bb–1(b)(1).
305
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of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”310
5. Claiming
The government can be called to account for nonconformance with
RFRA by a putative individual rights-bearer. The statute allows an
aggrieved person to assert a “violation of this section . . . as a claim or
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government.”311
In 2006, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal,312 a unanimous Supreme Court blocked the government from
enforcing the Controlled Substances Act in such a way as to burden a
religious group’s use of hallucinogenic tea. Following the implementation
of the Affordable Care Act in 2013, Hobby Lobby, a for-profit corporation
closely held by family members with certain religious beliefs, successfully
challenged the regulation stipulating that non-grandfathered employer
health plans cover contraceptives. 313
6. Isomorphism
Through this discussion it should be apparent that RFRA contains the
same structural elements as the other regulatory analysis statutes: (1) a
trans-substantive law passed by Congress; (2) imposing requirements upon
federal action across jurisdictional bounds; (3) triggered by a threshold
impact upon a favored value; (4) when that value is not otherwise protected
by the Constitution; (5) imposing a condition of heightened justification for
that burden; and (6) consisting of a showing of sufficiency of purpose and
fit. “Impact assessment,” in terms of a showing of “substantial burden,” is
required in order to make the threshold showing for the heightened scrutiny
to apply. The only conceivable differences between RFRA and the other
impact assessments we have examined lie in, first, the mechanism of
enforcement and second, the timing of when the justification must be
produced, a matter which is related to the mode of enforcement. According
to UMRA, any member of Congress can raise a point of order to prevent
the statute from going forward for failure to fulfill the heightened
justification requirement. Under RFRA, the power of the courts can be
harnessed to strike the rule or statute for failure to fulfill the heightened
justification requirement. Of course, because of the nature of judicial
review as opposed to points of order, the justification need not be tendered
ex ante before the measure is issued as the court action will usually occur
310
311
312
313

Id. § 2000bb–1(b)(2).
Id. § 2000bb–1(c).
546 U.S. 418 (2006).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
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post hoc.
C. Assessment of Federal Regulations and Policies on Families
The Fiscal Year 1999 Treasury Appropriations bill required that any
agency rule include an assessment of the rule’s impact on family wellbeing.314 This interest, however, was specifically defined in a way that
reveals an agenda of hidden purposes not apparent from the labeling of the
interest at issue. The provision demanded the following:
Before implementing policies and regulations that may affect
family well-being, each agency shall assess such actions with
respect to whether . . .
(2) [agency actions] strengthen or erode the stability or safety of
the family and, particularly, the marital commitment; [or]
(3) [they affect] authority and rights of the parents in the
education, nurture and supervision of their children;
(3) [the agency action] helps the family perform its functions, or
substitutes governmental activity for the function; [ . . . ]
(8) the action establishes an implicit or explicit policy
concerning the relationship between the behavior and personal
responsibility of youth, and the norms of society. 315
These specifications of family well-being are neither politically
neutral nor inevitable. Setting aside this politically contestable framing of
“family well-being” as personal responsibility, autonomy from
government, and the sanctity of marriage, what is notable about this
statutory text is the qualitative rather than quantitative identification of
burden. The qualitative definition of burdens suggest that fungibility or
tradeoff against other values is not assumed, and therefore sets this impact
assessment apart from the default CBA that would apply to any other type
of implicated interest lacking a special RIA privilege.
1. Sufficiency of Purpose and Fit
The family impact assessment lacks specificity in requiring purpose or
fit. It does demand, however, that the regulation be assessed for whether
the proposed benefits of the action justify the impact on the family.
Under § 654(d) of the appropriations language, a rule that is
determined to have a negative effect on families must be supported with an
“adequate rationale.” “Adequacy of rationale” could be understood to
require a sufficiently important purpose or reason for the “family burdens”

314

Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999,
Pub. L. 105–277 § 654, 112 Stat. 2681; 5 U.S.C. § 301 note (1999) (containing language
establishing a family impact assessment).
315
Pub. L. 105–277 § 654(c).

HO (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

LEGISLATING A NEGATIVE RIGHT TO HEALTH

12/21/2019 3:51 PM

693

inflicted. The adequacy of the rationale could also imply an associated fit
requirement such that no portion of the burden is unnecessary and
unjustifiable.
2. Claiming
The provision specifically states: “This section is not intended to
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by
a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any
person.”316 Members of Congress may demand compliance, however.
According to § 654(e), “Upon request by a Member of Congress relating to
a proposed policy or regulation, an agency shall conduct an assessment . . .
and shall provide a certification and rationale.” Presumably failure to
comply could result in practical consequences such as oversight hearings or
appropriations riders.
Though the rights-like features characterizing other impact
assessments are lacking somewhat in clarity, the Family Impact
Assessment may yet prove a forerunner of a more robust future regulatory
analysis requirement. 317 Indeed, the Family Impact Assessment itself was
preceded by EO 12606.318
D. Private Property/Takings Executive Order
In the late 1980’s, Reagan signed EO 12630, “Governmental Actions
and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights.” 319 It has
not since been revoked. Under this EO, before any agency undertakes
regulation of private property to protect public health or safety, it must
show sufficiency of purpose and fit.320
1. Scope
This heightened justification requirement clearly extends to regulatory
burdens on private property that do not rise to the level of takings. Even
without examining the case law on regulatory takings, this point is evident
from the language of the EO. Part of the statement of heightened
justification required before the agency takes action is an “[e]stimate, to the
316

Id. § 654(f).
Some groups continue to advocate in this vein. See, e.g., Family Impact Institute,
History, PURDUE UNIV., https://purdue.edu/hhs/hdfs/fii/about/history (last visited Feb. 2,
2019).
318
Exec. Order No. 12,606, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,188 (Sept. 2, 1987).
319
Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Mar. 18, 1988). See 340B Drug Pricing
Program Ceiling Price and Manufacturer Civil Monetary Penalties Regulation, 82 Fed. Reg.
14,332 (Mar. 20, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 10), for an example of recent
regulation complying with its requirements.
320
53 Fed. Reg. 8859.
317
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extent possible, [of] the potential cost to the government in the event that a
court later determines that the action constituted a taking.”321 Thus, the set
of actions to which the EO is expected to apply exceeds the actions that
will later be found a taking. Meanwhile, the Congressional Research
Service reported at the time that “the majority of taking principles stated or
implied in the Executive Order 12630 overestimated the likelihood of a
taking.”322
2. Sufficiency of Purpose
The agency must first, “[i]dentify clearly, with as much specificity as
possible, the public health or safety risk created by the private property use
that is the subject of the proposed action.” 323 Thus, the purpose of the
regulatory action must be specifically articulated.
3. Fit
The EO next requires agencies to “[e]stablish that such proposed
action substantially advances the purpose of protecting public health and
safety against the specifically identified risk.” 324 The agency must show
what Alexy might call “suitability,” 325 namely, that the means do advance
the important justifying end or purpose identified above.
Also, the agency must “[e]stablish to the extent possible that the
restrictions imposed on the private property are not disproportionate to the
extent to which the use contributes to the overall risk.”326 This provision
requires another aspect of fit, namely, no excess burden that is somehow
not sufficiently linked with, and therefore cannot draw sufficient
justification from, the important purpose.
4. No Claiming under Executive Orders
Though these measures lack claiming mechanisms, 327 they should be
seen for their significance within a dynamic arc. They are present at one
moment in the ongoing struggle over popular conceptions of rights in the
321

Exec. Order No. 12,630 § 4, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Mar. 18, 1988).
ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RES. SERV., COMPARISON OF TAKING PRINCIPLES IN
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12630 WITH SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND RELATED
QUESTIONS (1988) (cited in GAO’s Recent Report on the Implementation of Exec. Order
12630 and the State of Federal Agency Protections of Private Property Rights: Hearing
before the H. Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of John D.
Echeverria, Exec. Dir., Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Inst., Geo. U.L. Center)).
323
Exec. Order No. 12,630 § 4(d)(1), 53 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8861 (Mar. 18, 1988).
324
Id. § 4(d)(2).
325
See ALEXY, supra note 107, at 396–98.
326
Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 318, at § (d)(3).
327
Erica Newland, Executive Orders in Court, 124 Yale L.J. 2026, 2075-2082 (2015).
322
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U.S. and may well evolve into a more robust right in the future.
Many of the other measures that feature mature claiming provisions
started out in precursor form. The Assessment of Impact on Families was
an opportunistic statutory expansion built upon an idea first encountered in
another executive order from the Reagan years.328 The Paperwork
Reduction Act was preceded by the Federal Reports Act.329 UMRA
succeeded the State and Local Government Cost Estimates Act of 1981
which had been in place for thirteen years but lacked the accountability
provided by points of order.330
Similarly, the extra-constitutional
protection of private property from regulatory burden may now take the
form of a mere executive order, but bills have been introduced since to
codify it.331 In 1995, H.R. 925 passed the House, though it later died in the
Senate. 332 This bill would have triggered agencies to compensate property
owners for the regulatory burdens on their private property use if that
federal agency action reduced the property’s fair market value by a certain
threshold percentage (eventually set at twenty percent).333 Meanwhile, the
EO itself has enjoyed significant longevity,334 continuing to elevate the
protection of private property rights above the constitutional baseline, just
as RFRA does for the protection of free exercise, and as UMRA does for
the protection of federalism-related values.
E. Other Impact Assessments Established by the Executive Branch
Other EO’s on the continuum may or may not yet merit the label
“rights.” Some constitute duties to the public at large, rather than duties
with corresponding rights. For instance, President Clinton signed EO
13,175 for “Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments,”335 which bears some similarities to UMRA. No agency
328

See supra text accompanying note 318.
Shapiro & Moran, supra note 145, at 17–18.
330
State and Local Government Cost Estimates Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-108, 95
Stat. 1510 repealed by Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 104,
109 Stat. 48, 62; see also Garrett, supra note 240, at 1153, 1160–63.
331
Private Property Rights Act of 1991, S. 50, 102nd Cong. (1991) (introduced by
Senator Steven Symms).
332
Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995). This
provision was also included in the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, H.R. 9
§§ 201–210, 104th Cong. (1995) as a component of the Republican’s Contract with America.
See SINCLAIR, supra note 188, at 113–33; see also THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO
HARM 78 (2013) (explaining that Senate Republicans failed to overcome filibusters on
various omnibus regulatory reform efforts.).
333
SINCLAIR, supra note 188, at 122–25.
334
See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-03-1015, REGULATORY TAKINGS: IMPLEMENTATION
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER ON GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AFFECTING PRIVATE PROPERTY USE 4
(2003).
335
Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 9, 2000).
329
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should promulgate a regulation that has “tribal implications” or preempts
tribal laws without consultation with tribal officials or without providing
OMB with the summary impact statement. 336 This “tribal summary impact
statement” need, however, only describe the agency’s consultation and
state the extent to which the tribal concerns have been met. No particular
countervailing purpose or minimization of burden is required.
President Clinton’s EO 12,988, “Civil Justice Reform,” 337 directed
agencies to review all new and old regulations to ensure that they are
“written to minimize litigation.”338 Again, this deviates from the canonical
requirement of requiring a sufficient countervailing purpose and certainly
lacks any vision of particular claimant whose rights correspond to this duty.
President George W. Bush issued EO 13211, “Actions Concerning
Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution or Use,”
which required federal agencies to prepare a “Statement of Energy Effect”
(SEE).339 This SEE is triggered only when federal actions may have
“significant adverse effect” on “supply, distribution, and use of energy.” 340
OMB issued a memorandum in 2001 listing circumstances that would
constitute “a significant adverse effect,” including reductions in crude oil
supply in an amount over 10,000 barrels per day, reductions in coal or
natural gas production of a certain amount, and increases in the cost of
energy production and distribution in excess of one percent. 341 Some
environmental advocates warned this EO could “curtail critical habitat
designation or other environmental protection” 342 and therefore urged
Obama to repeal it in his first hundred days. 343 He declined to do so, and
this EO remains in effect today. 344
And oddly, the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) itself fell
short of the specificity of the impact assessments we have looked at thus
far, merely requiring agencies to “take into account the effects of the

336

Id.
Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (Feb. 7, 1996).
338
Id. § 3(a)(2).
339
Exec. Order No. 13,211, 66 Fed. Reg. 28355 (May 22, 2001).
340
Id.
341
OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. PRESIDENT, OMB MEMORANDUM M-01-27,
GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING EXEC. ORDER 13211 (2001).
342
Elizabeth Glass Geltman et al., Inquiry into the Implementation of Bush’s Executive
Order 13211 and the Impact on Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 27 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 225, 228 (2016).
343
REBECCA BRATSPIES ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, PROTECTING PUBLIC
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT BY THE STROKE OF A PRESIDENTIAL PEN: SEVEN EXECUTIVE
ORDERS FOR THE PRESIDENT’S FIRST 100 DAYS 33 (2008).
344
Elizabeth Glass Geltman et al., Impact of Executive Order 13211 on Environmental
Regulation: An Empirical Study, 89 ENERGY POL’Y 302, 302 (2016).
337
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undertaking” on historical properties. 345 The implementing regulation,
however, contemplates a process that at least partly tracks NEPA. 346
NHPA-compliance is even accorded judicial review as an adjunct to
judicial review for NEPA-compliance. 347
Examples abound.348
But many of these impact assessment
requirements depart from the structured, individuated analysis that
characterizes rights. For instance, whom does the energy order protect?
Certainly, energy sector interests are protected. In addition, the provision
seems to contemplate the interests of the general public who pay energy
bills and depend on energy supplies. Though these examples impose
certain assessment duties upon agencies, they can be fairly characterized as
duties to the public-at-large.
F. Regulatory Right to Know
The misleadingly named “Regulatory Right-to-Know Act” falls short
of a right. Passed in the 2001 Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act,349 it is understood as a legislative rider imposing a
permanent reporting obligation upon OMB. 350 Its precursors include
similar reporting requirements that took the form of one-year riders.351 The
Regulatory-Right-to-Know report is due only once a year rather than
triggered with each agency action. It is submitted to Congress along with
the President’s budget and requires reporting in the aggregate, totaling the
costs and benefits of all major rules, and stratifying by agency and major
rule. The agency must produce not just an estimate of total costs and
benefits, but impacts on other favored values: “state, local, and tribal

345

16 U.S.C. § 470 (2018) (current version of Act in scattered sections of 54 U.S.C.); 36
C.F.R. § 800 (2019).
346
See Tyler v. Cisneros, 136 F. 3d 603, 608–09 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Boarhead
Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1024 (finding that despite an implied right of action under
the APA for judicial review associated with NHPA, the district court lacked jurisdiction for
other reasons.).
347
See Cisneros, 136 F. 3d 603, 608–09.
348
See e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. § 203 (1974), amended by Executive
Order No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R. § 161 (1977) (requiring statements of inflationary impact.).
349
31 U.S.C. §1105 (2018). Similar provisions were previously passed as fiscal year
riders in § 625 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
1999, Pub. L. No. 105–61 (1998); see also Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105–277, § 638(a), 112 Stat 2681,
2681–525 (1998).
350
See CAREY, supra note 120, at 7 n.31 (stating that this note “put in place a permanent
requirement for an OMB report on regulatory costs and benefits”).
351
Angela Antonelli, Regulatory Right to Know: Tracking the Costs and Benefits of
Federal Regulation, HERITAGE FOUND. (April 20, 1999), https://www.heritage.org/governme
nt-regulation/report/regulatory-right-know-tracking-the-costs-and-benefits-federal.
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governments, small businesses, wages, and economic growth.” 352 The
generality of this requirement renders this RIA more of a duty to the
public-at-large.
The measure may seem duplicative insofar as costs and benefits must
already be considered for each major rule under EO 12,866. Because EOs
do not, however, apply to independent regulatory agencies, which include
such major actors as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Reserve, and the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, this Congressional “Right-to-Know”
provision does at least ensure agency coverage.
G. Agency-Specific RIAs
There are many other RIA provisions that I neglect here because they
are not trans-substantive, applying to a narrow segment of agencies. As
such, they may be indistinguishable from statutorily-mandated factors that
the agency must consider when regulating. 353
For instance, according to § 1102 of the Social Security Act,
regulations implementing the Medicare and Medicaid titles are not to be
advanced without consideration of their effects on rural hospitals. 354
Similarly, § 106 of the National Securities Market Improvement Act
of 1996 requires the SEC to always consider, “in addition to the protection
of investors, whether [an] action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.”355
The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has issued a departmental
policy requiring a civil rights impact analysis for all loans or “conditional
commitments.”356 I leave these RIAs aside for now. 357
IV. THE GLARING OMISSION OF HEALTH
A. Health is Not on Equal Footing
Thus far, our discussion reveals a field of contest over conceptions of
rights. A picture emerges of ongoing struggle to elevate certain protected
interests to rights status. Moreover, this struggle is happening in the

352
31 U.S.C. § 1105 (2018); Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–554, § 624, 114
Stat. 2763, 2763A–161(a)(2).
353
See CAREY, supra note 120, at 11.
354
Social Security Act § 1102(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2018).
355
15 U.S.C. § 77b (2018); Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Toward a Framework of Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 1987 (2013).
356
7 C.F.R. § 4279.60 (2019).
357
See 22 U.S.C. § 2576 (2018) (requiring disarmament impact statements for all new
weapons systems); Department of Transportation Act § 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2018).
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legislative and administrative domains.
How would we characterize the state of play? By this snapshot, we
enjoy a panoply of negative rights, namely, freedom from governmentimposed paperwork, freedom for small businesses from economic burdens,
and religious freedom beyond constitutional levels of protection. State
interests are shielded from economically burdensome federal mandates,
property owners assert freedom from subconstitutional regulatory takings,
and “traditional” families enjoy certain autonomies. But are we free from
government action that burdens people’s health? In some politically
motivated instances, we virtually ban HIA, as seen in the case of guns and
their effect on health.358 We have indirect claims under NEPA and the
ESA, in the form of protected interests in environmental protection.
Environmental entitlements are urgent, but classic environmental exposure
is not the only threat to health. There is a glaring gap for the protection of
basic human well-being. Therefore, I propose we institute an HIA
requirement.
The selective imposition of accounting and justification requirements
provides a familiar procedural means of institutionalizing substantive
norms. Selectively procedural and therefore “semi-substantive” means of
protecting background rights have been noted in other contexts. 359
V. THE PROPOSAL
Here I present options to consider for an HIA requirement that I
believe should be enacted by Congress. I offer these features as a starting
point for policy debate.
Because this HIA would be imposed by statute, not executive order, it
would also cover independent regulatory agencies. The bill would have to
specify an HIA triggering condition based on the nature of a policy’s effect
on health. This threshold question has been crucial in each of the RIA

358

Language from the so-called Dickey Amendment has been inserted into
appropriations bills each year since 1996, preventing funds from being used “to advocate
[for] or promote gun control.” This language, while not strictly forbidding research or datagathering on the health effects of gun policies, has chilled such conduct and remains in the
FY2018 Appropriations bill. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115–141, §
210, 132 Stat. 348, 736 (2018). For another example of statutory language that, although
not yet enacted, seeks to prohibit impact assessment, see Local Zoning Decisions Protection
Act of 2017, H.R. 482, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017), which declares, “[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law, no Federal Funds may be used to design, build, maintain, utilize, or
provide access to a Federal database of geospatial information on community racial
disparities or disparities in access to affordable housing.”
359
See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional
Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 6,
39 (2008).
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measures we have examined. 360 One could assign the duty to either an
agency head or a designated health official. This approach draws from the
example set by RFA, whereby the agency head must decide and certify
whenever government action avoids a threshold impact on “a substantial
number of small entities.”361 A determination of “no substantial impact on
health” would be subject to judicial review, just as a certification of
insignificant impact is under RFA, or FONSI is under NEPA. 362
Alternatively, we could adapt the NEPA mechanism, whereby the
impact analysis and detailed statement condition would apply to “major
Federal actions significantly affecting” human health, and the agency
would have to perform some kind of preliminary HIA to see if this
threshold is met. This two-step process parallels the mechanism of the
preliminary “EA” under NEPA, which concludes in either a FONSI or
proceeds to a full EIS. This example illustrates how a trigger mechanism
could be designed such that an early, smaller HIA might be required for all
government action. Meanwhile, the desire to avoid full HIAs might
encourage health commitments across sectors as various government
organs seek the HIA equivalent of “mitigated FONSIs.”363 I discuss below
what form those mitigating actions might take. 364 NEPA’s implementation
also proves that a trigger threshold need not be specified in advance and
can be elaborated case-by-case.
For HIAs to empower beneficiaries as rights-holders, we should
consider adding a mechanism for individuals or their representatives to
initiate or call for the HIA heightened justification procedure. The
availability of judicial review for the determination of “no trigger” under
RFA or FONSI under NEPA, would represent one avenue. One could also
establish a Chief Counsel for Health Advocacy along the lines of the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration, which would
institutionalize representation of community health interests.365
UMRA requires CBO to judge a bill’s projected costs to subnational
governments against the triggering threshold to determine whether a point

See Shapiro & Moran, supra 145, at 170–71 (observing, “[m]uch as the vague
definition of ‘significant impact’ in the [Regulatory Flexibility Act] was a source of agency
discretion, the term ‘economically significant’ in the UMRA was largely left open to
interpretation by individual agencies. Critics of the Act noted that the vague definition
allows agencies to evade assessments and benefit-cost analyses by determining that rules do
not qualify as economically significant. The GAO supported this criticism, stating that the
Act gave agencies too much discretion in complying with the requirements.”).
361
See supra text accompanying notes 162–165.
362
Id. See also text accompanying note 200, at 466–67.
363
See supra text accompanying note 199, at 932–33.
364
See infra text accompanying notes 388–389.
365
See supra text accompanying notes 180–185. I thank Alan Morrison for this insight.
360
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of order would lie against it.366 Similarly, GAO or some other entity
designated by Congress could be tasked with calculating whether a bill
“significantly affects human health.” 367 Because health impacts are hard to
quantify, we could use qualitative thresholds like those under the Family
Impact Assessment. 368 Alternatively, we could piggyback on existing RIA
thresholds such that any action meeting the UMRA threshold as calculated
by CBO would also be subject to full HIA. For instance, the National
Historic Preservation Act has piggybacked on NEPA such that any “major
federal action” under NEPA also garners some process under NHPA. 369
Alternatively, “significantly affecting human health” could also be
construed as adversely affecting key health indicators for a numerical
threshold of persons by a certain magnitude. I do not believe this approach
requires an optimal set of thresholds. Some initial proxies could be set, just
as in Bush’s EO 13211, the effect on energy supply was established as
adversely affecting energy prices by more than one percent, or a drop in
crude oil production by 10,000 barrels a day or more. 370 Similarly, the
Gingrich Congress’ attempt to legislate regulatory takings identified a
trigger of twenty percent reduction in the property’s fair market value. 371
The difficulty of setting a perfect threshold should not block the
development of a provisional mechanism, just as those difficulties did not
impede the establishment of RIAs protecting other values.
A. Participatory
HIAs should follow NEPA in promoting participation. 372 This
commitment would enhance an emerging feature of HIAs whereby they are
taken up by disadvantaged communities and their supporting coalitions.
For instance, HIAs have been wielded by Native Alaskan tribal groups to
assert their interests in health and well-being through the state HIA process
as well as NEPA. 373 In Los Angeles, communities at risk of being

366

See supra note 233.
This idea takes inspiration from NEPA’s creation of CEQ and the Science Advisory
Board, and PRA’s authorization of OIRA. The HIA proposal, however, would authorize a
Congressional agency like CBO rather than an executive entity.
368
See supra text accompanying note 314.
369
See Tyler v. Cisneros, 136 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1998).
370
See supra note 333–334 and accompanying text.
371
See SINCLAIR, supra note 333.
372
See FERLO ET AL., NEPA LITIG. GUIDE, supra note 208, at 24–25.
373
See generally Integrated Activity Plan / Environmental Impact Statement, National
Petroleum
Reserve—Alaska,
U.S.
DEP’T
INTERIOR
(Nov.
2012),
https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/nepa/5251/41004/43154/Vol2_NPRA_Final_IAP_FEIS.pdf (constituting an EIS process where the Alaskan Inter-Tribal Council
participated heavily).
367
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dislocated by stadium development used HIAs to block the proposal. 374
Causa Justa’s community organizers recruited the Alameda County public
health department to survey the health harms of foreclosure. 375 In San
Francisco, HIAs contributed to the successful campaign for a living
wage. 376
Any member of Congress could call for an HIA for legislative
measures through a point of order. Arguably, this mechanism allows
democratic participation through lobbying, though this approach also
renders the tool more accessible to powerful interests.
B. Equity
The measure I propose would embed a preference for health equity
even more deeply into the HIA methodology. HIA should impose
justificatory burdens not just on actions with direct and indirect effects on
human health, but also on actions exacerbating health inequality.
A landmark British report on health disparities in 1998 declared that
“all policies likely to have a direct or indirect effect on health should be
evaluated in terms of their impact on health inequalities, and should be
formulated in such a way that by favouring the less well off they will,
wherever possible, reduce such inequalities.”377 The HIA could require
that “all policies likely to have a direct or indirect effect on health must
report their impact on health inequalities.”
The “fit” requirements, which I discuss below, could then proceed to
encourage policies to be formulated to favor the less well-off and reduce
such inequalities. 378 Mimicking the NEPA regulations which require the
agency decision-maker to “record” the environmentally preferable
alternative and justify how the agency rejected this alternative, 379 the
decision-maker could be required to “record” the most health equitypromoting alternative. If the agency chose otherwise, then it would have to
describe the reasons and cite the specific “economic and technical

374
See HUMAN IMPACT PARTNERS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RAPID
HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED FARMERS FIELD DEVELOPMENT (July 6,
2012), https://playfairfarmersfield.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/ff-hia_final_full.pdf.
375
Victoria Colliver, Foreclosures Can Make You Sick, Report Says, SFGATE (Sept. 2,
2010, 4:00 AM), https://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Foreclosures-can-make-you-sickreport-says-3254499.php.
376
See Gottlieb et al., supra note 79, at 9.
377
DONALD ACHESON ET AL., INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH
(1998).
378
For a recent proposal along these Rawlsian lines, see generally, Alicia Ely Yamin &
Ole Frithjof Norheim, Taking Equality Seriously: Applying Human Rights Frameworks to
Priority Setting in Health, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 296, 308, 324 (2014).
379
See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (2019).
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considerations and agency statutory missions . . . including any essential
considerations of national policy,” mirroring NEPA implementing
language. 380
For those who believe that attention to equity represents an
interjection of additional favored values into the HIA mechanism apart
from health, there are a few responses. One is that identification of health
impacts necessarily includes identification of the distribution of health
impacts as discussed earlier. 381 Furthermore, social and economic
inequality are major determinants of population health, with effects
independent of those caused by poverty. 382 Because the health gradient is
steeper at lower SES levels, SES distribution must flow downward to have
salutary effects on population health. Promoting equity is closely
congruent with the protection of health.
Second, we can argue that other RIAs also include ideologically
clustered secondary values. UMRA sneaks in concern not only for burdens
on States and localities, but also costs to private entities. The PRA includes
extra protection for privacy and small business.
C. Impact Analysis
The legislative and regulatory proposals that fall within the HIA
measure’s scope of application must include reporting on the burdens they
place on health and its distribution. Again, some impact analysis and
reporting would already exist from the threshold determination of the HIA
measure’s applicability, just as some environmental impact analysis is done
in the form of an EA to determine whether there is sufficient effect on the
quality of the human environment to warrant a full EIS.383
D. Sufficiency of Purpose
These health-affecting measures must also clearly declare the purpose
and need for that action. As with the PRA, an agency must describe the
“need” for the action being considered.384 Borrowing again from NEPA,
need must be framed in terms of “economic and technical considerations
and agency statutory missions . . . including any essential considerations of
national policy. . . .”385
As with UMRA, any legislative action would be subject to a
sufficiency of purpose showing insofar as a separate vote to overcome the
380
381
382
383
384
385

Id.
See supra Part I.C.1, and text accompanying notes 66–72.
See supra text accompanying notes 36 at 323.
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9, 1508.13.
See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c) (2018).
40 C.F.R. § 1505.2.
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point of order would be required, implicitly demonstrating congressional
conclusion that the non-health-sector policy furthers a sufficiently
important purpose to justify the burden on health.
E. Fit
Just as earlier we discussed the incorporation of equity considerations
by requiring a recording of the alternative that favors the least well-off, 386
that same recording requirement would apply to the least health-restrictive
alternative.
A point of order could be available for any health-affecting policy
that, as we mention above, reduced major health indicators of a population
by a certain threshold magnitude. Just as unfunded mandates could avoid
points of order if “funded,” HIA points of order could be avoided if the
health-burdening legislation included listed health-promoting measures.
We could deliberate over and devise what those might be, and I assume our
judgments on the appropriate mitigation policies would change with
changing circumstances. For instance, PRA specifies certain mitigation
strategies such as different compliance timetables and exemptions that must
be considered when small businesses are burdened. 387 ESA does the same
for endangered species. 388 The domain of must-consider health mitigation
and improvement strategies could be developed, including investment in
early childhood education, housing and other social determinants of health,
or some other action that would reduce the Gini coefficient. 389
F. Enforcement/Claiming
Beyond a point of order, compliance with regulatory as well as
legislative HIA requirements could be subject to judicial review. Even if
not specifically authorized, courts might still, as they have with NEPA,
construe judicial review to be available for whether agency action is
arbitrary and capricious in light of inadequacies in HIA.390

386

See supra text accompanying notes 377–382.
See supra text accompanying note 136.
388
See supra text accompanying note 281.
389
See generally DAVID BUCK & SARAH GREGORY, IMPROVING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: A
RESOURCE FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES (2013) (for nine recommendations to improve public
health and reduce inequalities).
390
See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976); see also Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizen’s Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (demonstrating a court’s ability to review
NEPA decisions).
387
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G. Lookback Review of Existing Federal Laws
A true Ungerian destabilization391 right would affect existing policies
as well as new policies. Thus, any policy might be analyzed and
challenged for its adverse effects on health and health equity. While this
notion may sound extreme, many of the examples I describe contain
precisely such lookback and ongoing tailoring requirements affecting
existing rather than new policies. 392
A recent example of lookback scrutiny is President Obama’s EO
13563, Improving Regulations and Regulatory Review. Section 6 requires
agencies’ plans for periodic review of existing “significant” rules. 393 A
five-year sunset was proposed by the Gingrich Congress for all regulations
subject to other types of RIAs. 394
Any already-approved legislation would be subject to judicial review,
just as any measure is now subject to RFRA challenge.395 Prior legislation
would also be vulnerable to a point of order certainly upon re-authorization
or amendment, but could also draw a point of order at designated reevaluation points, including appropriations, as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
I argue that we should move from sporadic to general use of HIAs to
foster a rights-based approach to health. My paper demonstrates that a
negative procedural right to health could be enunciated in the form of an
HIA requirement and thereby circumvent the difficulty of recognizing
positive social and economic rights in the U.S. legal tradition. Neoliberal
rights “deflect consideration of how we are systemically connected to one
another globally, irrespective of our choices.” 396 HIAs would seed a right
that pushes back on that view. 397
391

How do we unwind states of the world that are damaging? How do we combat the
inertia and the power of incumbents as they affect future humanity? For these goals we
need destabilization rights. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY : ANTINECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 530 (1987)
(explaining that “[d]estabilization rights protect the citizen’s interest in breaking open the
large-scale organizations or the extended areas of social practice that remain closed to the
destabilizing effects of ordinary conflict and thereby sustain insulated hierarchies of power
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Meanwhile the illusion of a distinction between positive and negative
rights is ever more difficult to maintain. The entitlements of the “haves”
are so blatantly non-neutral and involve choices to affirmatively allocate
state resources in their favor. The increasing circumstances of scarcity also
emphasize choice. We are so interconnected with one another and these
interconnections are now hypertrophic, as evidenced by climate change,
360-degree surveillance, 398 pervasive social media and algorithmic use of
big data. Coercion (or unconsented for harms or appropriations at the
hands of others) occur routinely yet our traditional lines and bulwarks of
liberty rights cannot contain the spillover. We need a complementary right
to insulate people from systemic harm as well.
Our freedom is not the only thing we can claim against one another.
Kantian rights of liberal autonomy protect a person in the abstract, stripped
of all specific character. A right to health, by attending to our embodied
selves, could serve as a useful corrective. Our liberal tradition sharply
divides the right from the good, while a right to health presupposes
continuity between rights and human flourishing. At least we may start
with a negative right to health as a baseline integrity from harm,
supplementing traditional liberty and property rights by marking another
place to toe the line, an additional index of justice.

398
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